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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the nature 
of a relationship which appears to exist between cognitive 
behavior under conditions of conflict and certain regulative 
characteristics of personality, namely cognitive control and 
psychological defense. Klein (1954) has reported that the 
effects of physiological drive arousal (i.e. thirst) upon 
cognitive behavior in situations having conflicting response 
possibilities with respect to the drive state, could be 
partially accounted for on the basis of the type of cognitive 
control employed. Cognitive control was defined by differential 
capacities to make adaptive responses to specified aspects 
of stimulus fields in the presence of specifically interfering 
cues. Cohen (1955), in a theoretically complementary study, 
found that the effects of psychological drive arousal (i.e. 
orality) upon cognitive behavior under conditions of drive-
related conflict was a function of the type of psychological 
defense employed. These findings indicate the probable 
utility of considering both cognitive control and psychological 
- 2 -
defense when studying the effects of motivational conditions 
upon cognitive performance in situations requiring conflict 
resolution. 
The complex accomodation between internal forces 
and the external environment, represented by the idea of 
reality adaptation, has been a central concern of various 
students of personality. Attempts to specify the nature of 
this accomodation have produced a variety of theoretical 
formulations organized around similar structural control and 
modulating concepts. 
Freud (1926, 1932, 1937) conceived of defenses and 
secondary process thought functions as agents which coordi-
nate drive discharge to the characteristics of the real 
world; defenses acting in the service of anxiety reduction, 
secondary process acting to preserve reality relationships. 
Piaget (1936, 1937a, 1937b, 1950) postulates inherent but 
modifiable "schemata," cognitive structures which mediate 
perception, action and thought, and which, through their 
function of representing reality, allow past experience 
and present requirements to influence behavior in the in-
terest of adaptation. Werner (1940) speaks of a definite 
ordered differentiation of reality relations starting with 
concrete, physical experience and developing finally into 
abstract conceptual "schemata." Various levels of reality 
adaptation are thus possible. Gestalt theory (Koffka, 1935; 
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Kohler, 1947) deals with phenomenal patterns of organization 
centrally interposed between incoming stimulation and be-
havioral response, with cognition especially being determined 
by the qualities of the stimulus interacting with the organ-
izational and response characteristics of the organism. 
Individual adaptive response characteristics are 
dealt with by Hartmann (1939, 1952) in terms of conflict 
free ego structures of primary and secondary autonomy, the 
ego's major control and executive apparatuses, which act 
to coordinate instinctual drive discharge to the constraints 
of the external environment in the interest of reality 
adaptation. The attempt to specify the characteristics and 
the individual variation in efficiency with which this con-
trol and coordination are effected led Klein and his associ-
ates (Gardner et.al., 1959; Holzman and Klein, 1951; Klein 
and Schlesinger, 1944; Klein and Salmon, 1952; Klein, 1954) 
to the conception of cognitive controls. These are viewed 
as conflict-free regulative and directional ego processes 
which delay, modulate and diversify the individual ways in 
which the need and drive states are expressed in the process 
of reality adaptation. 
The present thesis is concerned with the problem 
area of conflict resolution, i.e., reality adaptation 
under conditions of psychological conflict, with particular 
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reference to the influence on learning of certain conflict-
resolving structures, cognitive controls and psychological 
defenses. 
Certain theoretical and experimental efforts reviewed 
in Chapter II below, with particular reference to Cohen's 
study (1955), have established the relevance of the defense 
concept to the problem of cognitive efficiency under condi-
tions of conflict arousal. The theoretical efforts of 
Hartmann and his colleagues (Hartmann, 1939, 1951, 1952; 
Kris, 1950; Rapaport, 1951) plus the theoretical and experi-
mental efforts of Klein and his associates, cited above, 
suggest strongly that the addition of the cognitive control 
dimension should allow for even more precise specification 
of the relationship between conflict and cognitive efficiency. 
It is the purpose of the present study to ascertain 
and examine the nature of the presently accepted relationship 
between motivational states and cognitive aspects of adapta-
tion, especially in situations of conflict between motives, 
to advance a set of logically related assumptions which will 
conceptualize the relationship between the coping variables 
of cognitive control and psychological defense, then to 
develop operational measures of these two concepts, and fi-
nally to attempt differential predictions of learning under 
conditions of conflict as a consequence of such an analysis. 
In so doing, a contribution can be made to the theory of 
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conflict resolution and, more generally, to the understand-
ing of the processes involved in the development and pre-
servation of reality adaptation. In addition, an operational 
definition of the cognitive control dimension would have 
considerable utility for research on the evaluation of ego 
functioning. 
A. 
CHAPTER II. 
FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM 
I. Review of the Literature 
1 Motivational States in Relation to Cognitive Aspects 
of Adaptation. 
The nature of the psychological resources with which 
human beings attempt to harmonize their own needs and the 
demands and constraints of the world around them has long 
been under psychological study. The observation that human 
motivations are rarely free of conflicting or antagonistic 
tendencies, some of which are not in the individual's 
awareness, suggested that the understanding of the manner 
in which these antagonisms are resolved in the service of 
adaptation required process concepts which could cope with 
the complexities of drive arousal, conflict, anxiety and 
their integration with reality demands. In particular, 
the understanding of cognitive aspects of adaptation to 
such varied influences required concepts which could account 
tcognition is used here in a narrow sense to denote 
such functions as learning, memory, perception, discrimina-
tion and problem solving. 
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for the interrelationships between motivational conditions 
and environmental constraints. 
Freud's efforts (1900) to develop a conceptual 
framework within which to understand the influences of drive 
and need states upon behavior led him to consider an arrange-
ment of ego-control processes through which drive discharge 
could be brought into coordinate relationship with drive 
modification, delay of drive expression, the assessment of 
reality and the harmonizing of internal pressures with 
external or environmental constraints. The influence of 
motivational states upon perception, and cognition generally, 
was seen by Freud as being exerted through the limiting and 
modifying function of these structures. 
In psychoanalytic writings heavy emphasis is accorded 
to the defenses as control processes interposed between 
conflictual stimuli and cognitive response. Thus Fenichel 
(1945), in discussing memory function in relation to repression 
writes: 
Repression consists of an unconsciously pur-
poseful forgetting •.. of internal impulses or 
external events which represent allusions to 
objectionable instinctual demands. (p. 148) 
Anna Freud makes a similar point in relation to the effects 
of defensive action upon recall (1946,) : 
Repression gets rid of instinctual derivitives just as external stimuli are abolished 
by denial. {p. 190) 
-8 -
These formulations of the repressive defense are 
stated in absolute terms; objectionable drive states and 
external events which allude to them are excluded from 
awareness. In his paper on "Repression" Freud (1915) 
attempts to develop the concept of the regulative function 
of the defense processes by specifying an intensity 
relationship between defenses and the access of instinct 
derivatives to consciousness: 
It is not correct to suppose that repression 
withholds from consciousness all the derivatives 
of what was primarily repressed. If these 
derivatives are sufficiently far removed from 
the repressed instinct-presentation they have 
free access to consciousness. It is as though 
the resistance of consciousness against them 
is inversely proportional to their remoteness 
from what was originally repressed (p.88). 
In addition to this repression of ideational derivatives, 
Freud postulated (1915) another element of instinct presen-
tation, the charge of affect, which can also undergo repres-
sion but which is quite different from the repression of the 
idea to which the affect belongs. This affect becomes 
detached from the idea and undergoes a separate repressive 
process which can result in consequences quite different 
from those produced by ideational repression. Freud (1926) 
and Anna Freud (1946) developed this idea into the conception 
of the defense mechanisms of isolation and intellectualization: 
- 9 -
an idea is isolated from the emotional cathexis that was 
originally connected to it, this emotion is repressed and 
the idea can enter consciousness without arousing excessive 
anxiety. Rapaport (1951, p. 703), summarizing these 
theoretical efforts, suggests that the conflict between 
drives and reality demands results in the development of 
defense mechanisms which affect cognitive functioning 
in an inhibitory fashion, as in repressive forms, or enhance 
them as in intellectualized forms. 
These formulations concerning the impact of motivational 
states upon cognitive functioning led to a great deal of 
experimental and theoretical effort attempting to relate 
motivational variables to such cognitive functions as learning, 
memory, and perception. Some of the earliest studies used 
a very loosely defined concept of the S's frame of reference 
to explain differential cognitive effects. For example, 
Bartlett (1932) found that recall was positively related to 
the past experience of the subject. Clark (1940) found that 
females showed superior recall to males for prose material 
in which women were presented as superior to men. In retro-
spect, the concept of motivated or selective forgetting of 
conflictual material seems applicable to Clark's results. In 
1943 Levine and Murphy extended the frame of reference concept 
to the study of political attitudes by demonstrating selective 
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recall for pro and anti-soviet paragraphs in subjects chosen 
for their pro and anti communist group affiliations. 
Edwards (1941) extended the study of the factors 
involved in the frame of reference concept by bringing into 
consideration the question of the status of the stimulus with 
respect to conflict. The psychoanalytic concept of repression 
had led to a number of studies of learning which employed 
pleasant, unpleasant, and indifferent stimulus material with 
equivocal findings. Edwards concluded that certain assumptions 
inherent in ~is procedure concerning the relationship 
between pleasantness, unpleasantness and personal desires, 
beliefs and attitudes were incorrect: 
An experience is excluded from consciousness not 
because it is unpleasant, but rather because it 
involves conflict. Conflict may be accompanied or 
followed by unpleasantness but it is not the un-
pleasantness which is the determiner of forgetting; 
it is the conflict. {p.34). 
Using college students whose opinions had been categorized 
as "pro", "anti" or "neutral" regarding a then current 
political movement, Edwards obtained recall scores for a 
speech containing half favorable and half unfavorable comments 
about this movement. His results supported the hypothesis 
that ideas which conflict with an existing frame of reference 
are recalled less well than ideas which are harmonious with 
the frame of reference. In addition, the speech material 
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that was congruent with a given subject's frame of reference 
was remembered even better than the neutral material. Sub-
sequent studies cited below tend to confirm Edwards' identifica-
tion of conflict between stimulus and frame of reference 
as a significant influence upon cognitive functioning. 
The studies cited to this point have used recall as 
the major dependent variable. Their findings have been 
supported by other studies in which perceptual forms of 
cognitive activity were used as the dependent measures. 
A major study by Postman, Bruner and McGinnies (1948), 
oriented toward investigating the influence on perceptual 
behavior of valued and contravalent stimuli, found that 
subjects whose values had previously been established on 
the Allport-Vernon Study of Values show~d lower recognition 
thresholds for tachistoscopically presented words which 
were harmonious with their values, than for contra-valued 
or indifferent words. Selective sensitization to valued 
stimuli and perceptual defense against contra-valued stimuli 
were the concepts advanced to account for these findings. 
Conflict between value state and value inimical stimuli was 
a necessary condition for obtaining the perceptual defense 
effect. 
An attempt to bring the conflict variable more 
explicitly into focus by studying the influence of conflict 
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between motives upon perception was reported by McGinnies 
in 1949. Recognition thresholds for highly sexual, profane, 
and aggressive words were significantly elevated as compared 
with emotionally neutral words. Furthermore, galvanic skin 
responses after word exposures which preceeded correct word 
recognition were greater when the exposed word was taboo 
than when it was neutral. In this instance, degree of conflict 
between strong drive related stimuli and strong cultural 
prohibition against commerce with such stimuli was viewed 
as a major determinant of the obtained perceptual differences. 
Perceptual defense against anxiety arousing stimuli was again 
advanced in explanation of these findings. Subsequent 
studies (Freeman, 1954; Lacy, Lewinger and Adamson, 1953) 
suggested significant limitations on the degree of generality 
ascribable to findings obtained by this "taboo word" technique. 
Where S's had no expectation of seeing taboo words, perceptual 
defense effects were observed, but where S's were instructed 
to expect sexual, profane and aggressive words, recognition 
threshold differences in favor of the perceptual defense 
hypothesis did not occur. Instead, a sensitization or 
vigilance effect in the form of lowered recognition thresholds 
for taboo words was observed. These findings seem to qualify 
McGinnies' original conclusion to the extent that the influence 
of taboo words on perceptual functioning cannot be viewed as 
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a simple one to one relationship; such words are related to 
differential effects upon perception, but the S's stimulus 
expectations are involved in determining ~hether perceptual 
defense effects will be forthcoming. 
Studies in which the dependent variable was shifted 
from recognition threshold to perceptual judgments (Bruner 
and Goodman, 1947; Bruner and Postman, 1948) reported a 
similar tendency for value and need to influence cognitive 
response in the direction of enhancing expression of ego-
syntonic needs and inhibiting expression of conflictual 
needs. 
A striking example of the ability of motivational 
factors to preserve reality relationships against powerful 
distorting influences was reported by Wittreich (1952) in 
a study of the so called "Honi" phenomenon. In the Ames 
distorted room (1951), the subject typically sees the room 
as normal, while a face will shrink or enlarge in size 
depending upon the window through which it is seen. When 
faced with their own spouses however, Wittreich's subjects 
reported the room as distorted rather than the faces of their 
marital partners. Apparently, reversal of the intrinsic 
motivational characteristics of the stimulus situation 
resulted in a sharp and sudden imposition of internal controls 
over perceptual distortions which otherwise were accepted 
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without awareness of possible inaccuracy. 
The investigations examined to this point tend toward 
the interpretive generalization that a conflictual value or 
need in interaction with a need-relevant task will inhibit 
cognitive efficiency, while a non-conflictual need will not 
interfere with and may even facilitate cognitive efficiency. 
This reported facilitation effect has an ambiguous status 
inasmuch as the neutral or the valued stimuli, and the 
threatening or conflictual stimuli employed in the various 
studies were not equated for ease or difficulty of cognitive 
manipulation. 
As the influence of need and conflict states upon 
cognition grew more apparent, various investigators devel-
oped methodological refinements which permitted specification 
of the need or conflict involved, as well as some indication 
of the ego-syntonic versus ego-alien status of the need for 
the individual subject. These refinements led to more precise 
prediction concerning the effect of need-related stimuli upon 
cognitive response. 
McClelland and Lieberman (1949) found that subjects 
identified as having high achievement need recognized 
achievement-related words with success connotations more 
rapidly than subjects rated low on achievement need. 
In an effort to use conflict around ego-alien drives 
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as a predictive factor, Eriksen (1951) selected two groups of 
subjects, chronic alcoholics and paranoid schizophrenics, who, 
on the basis of psychoanalytic theory, would be expected to 
have strong conflict around personally unacceptable succorant 
and homosexual needs. He found raised perceptual thresholds, 
relative to a third heterogeneous group, in response to 
stimulus words related to these need areas. 
Kleinman (1954), testing the clinical observation that 
psychogenic deafness was related to strong conflict in the 
area of authority relationships, found elevated auditory 
thresholds for a psychogenic group, relative to an organically 
deaf group, for certain words made anxiety laden by presentation 
in a playlet involving authority conflict. 
Cohen (1955) , using stimulus material which, on the 
basis of psychoanalytic theory, was assumed to arouse conflict 
around the expression of oral impulses, found that recall of 
this kind of material was a function of the type of psychological 
defense employed. Subjects categorized as preferring a 
repressive defense, showed significantly poorer recall than 
did subjects categorized as non-repressors even though both 
defense groups showed equal recall scores on neutral stimulus 
material. 
Wolf (1954) was able to support the hypothesis that 
learning rate was negatively related to conflictual hostile 
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drive in interaction with hostile stimulus material. Gofstein 
(1956), investigating this relationship further, found that 
recall can be either positively or negatively affected by 
hostile material depending upon the conflict status of the 
need state with which it interacts. 
A generalization which emerges from the studies reviewed 
above, is that drives, values, and motive states, when brought 
into relationship with cognitive tasks which conflict with 
them, tend to produce inhibitory effects on performance. (i.e. 
poorer recall, elevated recognition thresholds, etc.). With 
less certainty, there is evidence suggesting that these same 
need, drive, value and motive states do not interfere with 
performance on congruent or ego-syntonic cognitive basks. 
B. The Concept of Cognitive Control. 
Under the widespread influence of the studies reviewed 
above, the dependence of cognitive performance upon the effects 
of need and conflict states has become a major emphasis of 
much recent personality research. Given this emphasis, the 
fact has often been neglected in this area of experimentation 
that motivational effects do have limits, that unlimited 
alteration of cognitive functioning rarely occurs. Scheerer 
(1954), in commenting upon the perceptual defense experiments, 
makes the point that the interrelatedness of motivation upon 
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cognition has often been oversimplified: 
The experimentally induced distortions have 
usually been obtained under reduced or 
equivocal stimulus presentations. Since the 
deviations are rather small and inconsistent 
under these conditions, generalization about 
a one to one relation between need states 
and sensory perception may be premature. 
(p. 117). 
Interest in the limits of motivational effects upon percep-
tion led Klein and his colleagues (Gardner, Holzman and 
Klein, 1959; Klein and Salmon, 1952; Klein, 1954) to con-
sider certain hypothesized stable structural romponents 
of p~rsonality - cognitive controls - which act to modify and 
attenuate the influence of drives, defenses, and conflict 
states upon cognitive functioning in the service of ~re-
serving reality - adaptive functioning. 
The theoretical basis for such control functions 
was anticipated by Freud (1900) in his conception of the 
manner in which organized, secondary process thought acts 
to "correct" or modify primary process attempts at reaching 
gratification without due regard for the constraints and 
demands of reality. Adaptive thinking, in this view, con-
cerns itself with 
the connections between ideas without allowing 
itself to be misled •••• by condensations 
of ideas and intermediate or compromise for-
mations. (pp. 535 - 536). 
Such distorting operations are seen by Freud as "obstacles 
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to the attainment of the identity between thought and 
reality" (pp. 535 - 536) which makes adaptive behavior 
possible. 
The tendency of the thinking process must 
always be to free itself more and more 
from the exclusive regulation by the pain 
principle, and to restrict the development 
of affect through the work of thought to 
the very minimum which remains effective 
as a signal. (p. 536). 
Regulation of thought by the pain principle (more 
accurately by the avoidance-of-pain principle), refers to 
the various uncon.scious maneuvers of wi§h fulfillment, 
distortion and compromise formation which were eventually 
elaborated into the concept of ego defenses. However, Freud 
(1900) envieloned the distinct possiblity of a more con-
scious regulatory process, opposed to the action of the pain 
principle, and acting to maximize the adaptive capacity 
of the ego by making possible the tolerance of anxiety in 
the interest of adaptive functioning: 
It is quite possible that consciousness con-
tributes a more subtle regulation (of defensive 
tendencies), which may even oppose them, and 
perfect the functional capacity of the ap-
paratus by subjecting even that which induces 
pain to cathexis and elaboration. (p. 545). 
Considerations of this kind led Freud (1926) toward a point 
of view in which instinctual drives and external reality 
were finally brought together as central influences upon 
the ego's functions of adaptation. 
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This concept of a drive-limiting control process 
is part of a larger question: how are reality relationships 
developed and preserved as major adaptive functions of per-
sonality? In the context of this issue, the concept of 
cognitive controls has roots in several theoretical systems, 
in addition to psychoanalytic theory, which aid in develop-
ing a more precise theoretical definition of the concept 
and its application to the problem of reality adaptation. 
Where Freud emphasized the development of adaptive 
control functions which limit the effects of unconscious 
motivation on reality contact, Piaget (1936, 1937a, 1937b, 
1950) focuses on the development of the rational thought 
processes as the main instruments of progressively im-
proved congruence with reality. He postulates explicit 
cognitive structures - schemata - which act as mediating 
agents in perception, acting and thinking. These structures 
are the organism,•s apparatus for representing reality, the 
mental processes by which past experience is stored and 
made a determinant of present behavior. According to 
Wolff's (1960) synthesis of Piaget's concept, the schemata 
~eflexes arep?esent from birth but do not become actualized 
or stabilized unless repeatedly activated by external 
stimulation. Schemata are inborn capacities which require 
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stimulation by and interchange with the environment in 
order to develop. This formulation is quite similar to 
the position (~plained below) of Hartmann and of Klein for 
the cognitive structures with which they are concerned. 
The relationship of cognitive controls to P~aget 1 s 
schemata becomes clear upon examination of the two mechan-
isms - assimilation and accommodation - through which he 
sees schemata interacting with reality. (In Rapaport, 
1951). Assimilation refers to the tendency of the mental 
apparatus to organize external ideas into more complex 
systems; the organism imposes certain structures of its 
own on the environment. 
Intelligence could not apprehend the givens of 
the external world, were it not for certain 
synthetic functions of its own, the ultimate 
expression of which is the principle of the 
absence of contradictions. (p. 178). 
This principle of the absence of contridictions is 
also essential for Freud's distinction between primary 
md secondary thought processes, and is also the core, as 
Rapaport points out (1951, p. 178) of the concept of the 
synthetic function of the ego. Accommodation, in Piget's 
view, refers to a process whereby thought organizations 
change so as to conform to newly assimilated reality condi-
- 21 -
tiona, thereby allowing for the impact of the environment 
on the organism. Such cognitive structuring permits 
reality adaptation of the organism, where adaptation is 
defined as 
an interplay between assimilation and 
accommodation tending toward equilibrium. 
(Scheerer, 1954, p. 133.) 
The relationship between Piagetfs formulations 
and the concepts of ego autonomy and cognitive control 
have been cogently stated by Wolff (1960:) 
The concept of schemata and their modes of 
functioning (assimilation and accommodation) 
might serve as a model for all of the ego's 
autonomous functions ••• Piaget•s theory 
provides a detailed description of the forma-
tion of motor and mental anticipation patterns, 
the development of autonomy from stimulus 
dependence, the construction of detour and 
delay mechanisms ••• and the synthetic tendency 
of all reality and adaptive mechanisms to form 
one coherent and stable organization.(p.l70.) 
Piaget describes mechanisms (schemata, assimila-
tion, accommodation) which play a major role in 
the elaboration of defenses and other control 
structures, in their integration into egoT 
functioning, and in the reorganization of 
primary process mechanisms according to reality 
relationships. (p.l70.) 
Implied in these mechanisms is a process whereby 
change and development of the person are effected. As new 
ideas and new accomplishments are assimilated and accomo-
dated, alteration in the thought schemata occur, thereby 
allowing for adaptation to new situations which may be some 
degree of conflict with the existing schemata. In essence, 
- 22 -
this is a parallel concept to Allport's idea (1937) of the 
change in adult motivations through experience leading to 
"functional autonomy" from the dominance of infantile 
drive states. 
Werner (1937, 1948) shares with Piaget the 
assumption of reality representation progressing along 
definite developmental levels. The organism moves along 
a continuum from undifferentiated stages toward increasing 
differentiation of functions and capacities. A definite 
and invariant hierarchy of functions exist, genetic 
sequences progressing through a required order and 
direction. Reality relations for Werner (1937) are 
first experienced in sensori-motor activities, then 
through concrete perception and finally they are repre-
sented through conceptual schemata. 
This process of progressive differentiation 
(equivalent to Piaget•s concept of "decentering") is 
taken by Werner and Kaplan (1950) to mean that "an 
individual, depending on outer or inner circumstances, 
may operate at genetically differing levels." {p.lOl.) 
Among such outer or inner circumstances, drive and 
need states and the conflict status of the stimulus 
can rank as important determiners of the level of 
effectiveness, at which reality representation, and 
therefore adaptation, take place. 
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Gestalt psychology has dealt with problems or reality 
representation and reality relationships at various levels 
or theory and experimentation. The distinction between distal 
stimuli (the physical object) and proximal stimuli (the 
particular stimulus energy impinging on the sense organ) 
elaborated, principally in the realm or vision, by Koffka 
(1935) and Kohler (1947), led to examination or the question 
or how reliable knowledge about reality is obtained and 
preserved. A number or organizational concepts have been 
applied by the gestaltists to this question in the specific 
context or trying to elucidate perceptual aspects or cogni-
tive commerce with the external world. Their studies or 
visual constancy phenomena, where the characteristics or 
the distal object are preserved despite major variations 
in the proximal stimuli On the retina or the eye, were 
explained by invoking Koffka·•s ( 1935) concept of invariance 
which states that the response organization is oriented toward 
the total stimulus field so that any part of the field is alwa~ 
(invariantly)responded to in relation to the rest or the field. 
The relevance or the Gestalt concepts to the present 
study lies in their explanation or the preservation or 
accurate contact with the real world despite majorsources 
or ambiguity in the available stimuli. Cognition, in the 
Gestalt view, is controlled by structural, field response 
characteristics of the relevant response system, centrally 
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interposed between the source of stimulation and the 
behavioral response. The response dispositions of the 
person are therefore as important as the stimulus in 
determining cognitive response. It is precisely these 
response dispositions which the cognitive control and 
psychological defense concepts seek to specify and define, 
especially in situations of ambiguous stimulus and response 
possibilities; i.e., conflict. 
In the light of the efforts reviewed to this 
point, it is evident that Piaget, Werner and the Gestalt-
ists focus upon control principles which make possible the 
development and maintenance of accurate reality relation-
ships in the cognitive area. Psychoanalytic theory, prior 
to 1932, while also concerned with reality relationships 
within cognitive functioning, centered its attention 
upon control principles (defenses) which produce alter-
ations of perception and memory in situations of affec-
tive conflict arousal. In the former case the emphasis 
is upon factors making for progressively more accurate, 
reality-oriented cognition; in the latter case the 
emphasis is upon altered cognition in the interest of 
anxiety reduction. An integration of these positions 
would constitute an important theoretical advance 
because predictions of cognitive behavior could then 
be made which would take account of the human capacity 
both to master conflict and to be dominated by it. 
-0 
A major attempt at such a synthesis, organized 
around the issue of how awareness of and adaptation to 
reality relationships is developed, has been undertaken 
by Hartmann, (1939, 1951, 1952,) Kris (1950,) Rapaport 
(1951,) Nunberg (1948,) and others who share an expanded 
psychoanalytic point of view, which has come to be known 
as psychoanalytic ego psychology. Their efforts represent 
a major development and elaboration of Freud's concepts 
of secondary process and the reality principle (1932, 
pp. 105-108,) and his assumption of inborn, autonomous 
ego functions independent of instinctual drives (1937, 
pp. 343-344.) 
Development and preservation or reality rela-
tionships, as one part of the general problem of 
adaptation, is conceptualized by this group into three 
principal ideas; the conflict free ego sphere, the 
structures of primary and secondary autonomy, and the 
synthetic integrative functions of the ego. 
In the first instance, Hartmann (1951) diverges 
from Freud's view that the process of reality testing 
and the functions of judgment and discharge-delay 
originate in the conflict between instinctual drive 
and reality. Hartmann maintains that not every adapta-
tion or every learning and maturation process arises from 
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conflict; rather, there is a large area of conflict-free 
development for such functions as perception, memory, motility, 
learning and judgment. These functions are innate within the 
species and do not depend upon the vagaries of an individual~s 
conflict history for their origins. They can be profoundly 
influenced by conflict but their origins and functional 
characteristics are outside of conflict, within what Hartmann 
calls "the conflict-free ego sphere,'' and they can develop 
within the individual quite apart from any conflict influences. 
The importance of this concept lies in its departure 
from the traditional psychoanalytical view of secondary-
process thought. Such thinking, according to Rapaport 
(1951, p.366,) was treated as either "rationalization, 
projection, displacement substitutes, or products of 
isolation from effects." Hartmann·• a concept shifts .the-
origins of thinking away from exclusive roots in primary 
process mechanisms and toward ego-controlled, reality 
oriented structures. These he identifies as the inborn 
ego processes of "primary autonomy" which act to insure a 
state of adaptiveness of the individual to the external 
environment and which can develop their full potential 
entirely apart from conflict states, Memory, learning, 
judgment, and perception are examples of the capacities 
to which Hartmann is referring. 
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The idea of the conflict free ego sphere would ~ppear 
to contain two principal ideas; 1. the ego develops as a 
result of contributions from both conflictual and conflict-
free sources; 2. these conflict-free sources, while they 
may at times become involved in conflict, are part of the 
innate process of the ego and do not depend upon responses 
to conflict for their generation. 
Hartmann (1951} suggests that there is some 
permeability of the boundary between conflictual and conflict-
free functions: 
What started in a situation of conflict may 
become part of the conflict-free sphere. Many 
aims, interests, ego-structures, have originated 
in this way. What developed as an outcome of 
defense against instinctual drive may grow into 
more or less independent functions. (p.l34) 
These independent functions, evolved from conflict, are 
labeled by Hartmann as processes of "secondary autonomy." 
This view is obviously close to Allport*s (1937) 
earlier concept of functional autonomy: 
adult motives •••• are here regarded as 
contemporary systems, gro•ing out of antecedent 
conditions, including the hypothetical instincts, 
but functionally independent of them." (p.l94) 
With the origins of thinking thus brought closer to 
reality influences, with the development of adaptive functions 
now viewed as being free of complete dependence upon responses 
to conflict, the elements of another theoretical advance were 
at hand. The conflict-free ego sphere and the processes of 
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pr~mary and secondary autonomy led to the conception of 
generalized control processes, other than the classical 
defenses, having their origins in autonomous ego functions. 
These have been described by Nunberg (1948) as the synthetic 
and integrative functions of the ego. These functions, 
treated as the instruments of reality testing, are thought 
of as responding to stimulus situations on the basis of 
undistorted, realistic appraisal of both the environmental 
requirements and the state of the psychic apparatus. Unlike 
defenses, they subjugate conflict to reality requirements 
even if this involves the tolerance of anxiety-laden 
ideation. Thus Kris (in Rapaport 1951,) in discussing 
recall of repressed material, writes: 
The preconscious process which is under the 
control of the synthetic function of the ego 
is safe against repression; as a rUle it has 
effortless access to consciousness." (p.481) 
In a similar context, Rapaport(l951, p.480) assumes that 
the synthetic function of the ego is pitted against another 
ego function, defense, and acts to limit the effects of 
defense upon recall. Hartmann (1939), discussing the 
influence which various functions of the ego have on one 
another, views the synthetic function as a specific organ 
of equilibrium available to the individual. Recall, in 
Kris*s view fin Rapaport 1951, p. 483,) is dependent upon 
the state_ of the defenses and the capacity of the ego to 
cope with conflict, the clear implication being that ego 
control processes exist which mediate the action of the 
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defenses. 
In earlier psychoanalytic formulations (e.g. Freud's 
concept of repression quoted above) the outcome of any partic-
ular confrontation between reality constraints and instinctual 
representations could be seen as a problem in simple vector 
analysis. Defensive processes of a given intensity and 
direction interact with environmental stimuli of a given 
intensity and direction yielding behavior which is a 
resultant of the two interacting vectors. This more recent 
ego theory maintains that the problem is more complex in that 
a third force is seen as always influencing the outcome. 
Rapaport (1951) states this view directly: 
The autonomous energies of the ego app~ar as a 
partly independent factor in the struggle of 
drive demands (with reality), and not merely as 
a buffer or momentary expression of their 
momentary balance." (p. 702-703) 
Personality investigators like Gardner, Holzman, 
Klein~~· (1959) have developed and elaborated this ego 
psychology point of view around the organizing concept of 
cognitive controls. These they conceive of as 
slow changing, developmentally stabilized 
structures that are (a) relatively invariant 
over a given class of situations and intentions, 
and (b) operative despite the shifts in 
situational and behavioral contexts typical of 
cognitive activity from moment to moment •••• 
They are the individual's means of programming 
the properties, relations and constraints of 
events and objects in such a way as to provide 
an adaptively adequate resolution of the inten-
tions which brought him into an encounter with 
real! ty. ( p. 5) 
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Cognitive controls are viewed by this group as psychological 
instruments which resolve problems of adaption by exercising 
task-oriented selective influences upon the cognitive field 
with which the individual must deal. They are particularly 
focused upon the accurate representation of and coping with 
environmental forces. They resolve environmental disequilibria 
in terms of the constraints of reality situations or task 
instructions, rather than in terms of anxiety reduction. 
Within the continuous process of harmonizing environmental 
constraints with inner drives, cognitive controls are 
viewed as 
intervening structural conditions accounting 
in part for the particular impact of a need on 
cognition. They describe the characteristic 
ways in which reality-adaptive events have 
become organized in the person. {p.lO.) 
This distinction between antecedent conditions is 
made by Klein and his colleagues more for experimental 
purposes than for the extension and elaboration of theory. 
It is clear from the theoretical views cited above that both 
conflict and anxiety are involved in the activation of 
defenses and cognitive controls. Both defensti and 
cognitive contrOls ·can expedite or complicate drive 
discharge, and defenses can produce effective encounters 
with reality as well as resolving internal conflicts. It 
is therefore evident that these two control concepts do not 
represent two distinctly different ego processes. Rather, 
when studying the influence of motivational conditions upon 
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adaptive functioning considerable benefit should accrue from 
considering the relative contribution of defenses and 
cognitive controls in delaying and organizing drive discharge. 
At this point it is clear that the concept of 
cognitive control and the concept of defense are similar 
in that they both act to modify the manner in which drives are 
discharged. Defenses, for the most part, are viewed in 
psychoanalytic theory as specific control.processes 
influencing the response' to drive-engendered conflict in 
the service of anxiety reduction. Cognitive controls are 
seen as processes influencing the extenC to which drive 
discharge is coordinated to the adaptive necessities of 
specific environmental conditions, including conflict states, 
with relatively little interference from anxiety which may 
accompany such adaptive efforts. 
To Gardner, Klein et.al. (1959) it seems likely 
that rather than two complete distinct ego processes 
being involved, both defenses and cognitive controls 
share the same signal and action apparatus and that both 
achieve their effects by imposing a delay factor on drive 
discharge. They are distinguished principally by their 
antecedent conditions: 
The antecedent conditions of defense opera-
tions always include internal conflict ••• 
between drive and personal or societal 
restrictions against its expression ••• The 
antecedent conditions of cognitive control 
operations are realistic issues such as problem 
solving or the performance of a task. (p.l28.) 
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Experimental work derived from this body of theory 
has demonstrated that significant behavioral consequences 
can be predicted from such regulative concepts. Witkin (1950,) 
on the basis of perceptual tests requiring the ability to 
work against the structure of prevailing fields and to make 
judgments counter to strongly established contexts, dis-
tinguished between two distinct modes of coping; field depen-
dence and field independence. These in turn he found to be 
highly correlated with qualitative differences in a broad 
range of personality characteristics such as impulse control 
and self image. The personality characteristic most closely 
related to field dependence was a tendency towards passive 
submission to the demands of inner drive states, while active 
coping with these same demands characterized field independence. 
Holzman and Klein (1951,) using a variety of perceptual 
tasks, distinguished two forms of perceptual behavior leveling 
and sharpening -- whiOh characterized a wide range of task 
oriented cognitive responses. Schlesinger (1954,) working 
with a si~gle principle of cognitive organization -- focusing 
i.e. an underlying preference for experiencing the world in a 
narrowed, discriminating way, found that it was related to the 
ability to ignore task-irrelevant emotional stimulation and to 
adopt task oriented sets which were antithetical to each other. 
Klein (1954,) has applied the concept of cognitive 
control most directly to the problem of predicting the effect 
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of drive state upon cognitive performance with drive related 
stimuli. Based upon differing reactions to stimulus fields 
containing contradictory or intrusive cues, he distinguished 
between subjects who exhibit "constricted control" and those 
who show ''flexible control.'' s•s were assigned to these 
control modes on the basis of efficiency of performance with 
a criterion task, the Color-Word test, first used in this 
country by Ligon (1932,) and by Stroop (1935.) This 
instrument (described fully in Chapter III) assesses the 
ability m regulate competing response tendencies by 
actively inhibiting a highly overlearned but task irrelevant 
response while simultaneously facilitating a task relevant 
but highly unfamiliar response. Efficient performance is 
assumed to reflect an adaptive, appropriately varied control 
of intrusive stimuli; inefficient performance is assumed to 
reflect an interference-prone approach to the control of 
intrusive stimuli. 
Using thirst conditions as a paradigm for need 
arousal, Klein controlled fluid and salt intake so that 
each of hi~ two cognitive control groups was further sub-
divided into a thirsty group and a fluid satiated group. 
The four groups were then exposed to an experimental 
situation in which a card containing a picture of an ice 
cream soda in its center and an array of thirst-neutral 
objects around its periphery was presented tachistoscopi-
cally. Experimental instructions called for recognition 
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of as many peripheral objects as possible. Instrumentation 
was provided for determining changes in visual fixation points 
for each subject. Under these conditions the central stimulus 
object should be intrusive upon and disruptive of task com-
pliance. The results supported Klein's hypothesis that flexi-
bility in cognitive control would result in relatively more 
efficient coping with this type of interference. Moreover, 
the thirsty flexible control group showed significantly more 
fixations outside the center of the card and recognized 
significantly more objects than any of the other three groups 
including the satiated flexible gontrol group. Klein 
interpreted this finding as a demonstration of the flexible 
control group·•s ability to use need as a stimulant to more 
efficient performance. He recognized but did not deal with 
the possibility that specific ego defenses involved in 
controlling oral conflict expression could also have affected 
the behavior of his subjects. 
Support for Klein1s general finding that the influence 
of ne~d upon cognition is, at least in part, a function of the 
kind of cognitive control employed, comes from one recent study. 
Lazarus, Baker et. al. (1957,) using the 6olor-Word test as a 
measure of interference-proneness, found that under conditions 
of strong motive arousal (high and low monetary reward) S's 
showing high interference-proneness did poorly on tasks 
requiring precise, modulated control of impulse expression 
relative to the performance of S's showing low interference-
proneness. 
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The theoretical and experimental efforts reviewed 
thus far suggest that the analysis of individual differences 
in cognitive behavior under various conditions of drive or 
motive arousal will be incomplete if limited to a considera 
tion of coping processes designed to resolve conflict by 
producing alterations and failures in cognitive performance. 
A more complete analysis will also consider coping processes 
primarily responsive to reality constraints and functioning so 
as to coordinate drive demands with reality requirements in 
the service of adaptation. Cognitive performance under con-
ditions of conflict, but primarily subject to the influence 
of such coping processes, should be resistant to departure 
from the relevant standard of veridicality. The theoretical 
emphasis urged here is upon those control functions of the 
ego producing consensus rather than divergence in cognitive 
encounters with conflictual aspects of reality. 
C. The Concept of Defense. 
In personality theory anxiety has been accorded signi-
ficance by virtue of its dual role as a signal or indicator 
of conflict and as a reinforcing agent for defensive 
activities. These defensive manoeuvers are viewed as tending 
to preserve homeostasis by controlling the access of painful 
ideas and impulses to awareness, thereby reducing or 
eliminating the anxiety associated with them. Many defense 
mechanisms have been described in psychoanalytic writings 
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(Fenichel, 1945; Freud, A. 1946,) but within this variety it is 
possible to identify one common element; each of the mechantsms 
operates to alter the perception of some aspect of external or 
internal reality. As Frenkel-Brunswick (1939) has pointed out, 
defense mechanisms are "antagonistic to reality," they are a 
form of "self-deception" depending for their existence on the 
fact that they control anxiety. 
This process of anxiety reduction has been spelled out 
clearly in the instance of repression. According to Freud 
(1915a, 1915b,) an instinctual impulse can lead to behavior 
which draws punishment, loss of love, fantasies of cocnter-
aggression, etc. Subsequent arousal of the impulse can produce 
feelings of anxiety. Ideational representations of the 
impulse are repressed (primal repression,) as well as ideas 
that come into associative contact with the repressed repre-
sentation of the impulse (secondary repression,) in order to 
avoid these anticipated punishments, losses, etc. The pur-
poseful exclusion of these ideas from consciousness hinders 
their real effects as well as limiting the pain of becoming 
aware of them. 
An individual who tends to use repression as a favored 
defensive mode, when faced with the necessity for cognitive 
functioning in a task situation containing ideational repre-
sentations of repressed impulses, will have to react on the 
basis of less than all the potentially available information. 
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If the generatiop of the appropriate response happens to depend 
upon access to that information which the repressive process 
has made unavailable, the individual's adaptive efficiency 
will suffer accordingly. 
From the point of view of cognitive efficiency, psycho-
analytic theory accords the defense of isolation a mode of 
operation antithetical to that of repression. Where repression 
controls anxiety by limiting the access of ideas to awareness, 
isolation controls anxiety by severing the connection between 
an idea and the emotions appropriate to it; the idea enters 
consciousness, the affect does not. As Fenichel (1945) puts it: 
the most objectionable ideational contents like 
murder and incest wishes may then reach conscious-
ness ••• because the individual is able to feel these 
ideas as mere thoughts, securely isolated from 
motility. (p.l56) 
Extreme reliance upon isolation, as in obsessional 
neuroses, results in disorganization of cognitive activity, 
but isolation employed simply as a defensive mode should 
preserve cognitive activity in those situations where repression 
inhibits it. In a task situation weighted with ideational 
representations of conflict-related impulses (i.e. oral, 
aggressive, sexual,) reliance upon isolation should permit 
significantly more cognitive activity with such ideas than 
should reliance upon repression. 
A good deal of the experimental investigation,of the 
psychoanalytic concept of defense has focused upon the mechanism 
of repression and, as Sears (1944, p.321) has pointed out, 
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has followed two methodological paths:{l). the measurement 
of assumed existent repressions and, (2) the experimental 
induction of repression. 
(1). Measurement of Existent Repression. 
Meltzer (1930), Jersild (1931), and Stagner (1931) 
tested the recall for pleasant and unpleasant experiences 
of children and adults as a function of time intervals 
running from two days to several months. They all found 
a greater recall for the pleasant than for the unpleasant 
experiences. Waters and Leeper (1936) found in addition, 
a direct relationship between recall and the intensity of 
the affect associated with the experience. There is, 
however, some question with respect to each of these 
studies as to whether repression theory is applicable to 
the kinds of experiences examined, since significant personal 
threat was rarely if ever involved. 
In a study by Koch (1930), stimulus situations were 
selected with an eye to greater relevance for testing 
repression theory. College students were asked to indicate 
their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their grades on a 
series of ten examinations. After a five week interval, the 
students were asked to recall all ten grades. The best grades 
were recalled most readily, followed by the second or fifth 
best, depending upon whether or not the fifth grades were a 
serious threat to a student 11 passing ~e course. Koch 
interpreted these results as being in accordance with a 
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repressive hypothesis, but suggested that individual differences 
in relation to threat could also be significant determinants of 
such differences in recall. 
Sharp (1930) and Flanagan (1930) attempted to measure 
existent repressions for ideas which are more usually repPessed. 
Under the basic assumption that words having associative connec-
tion to areas of instinctual expression widely repressed in 
western culture would themselves tend to be repressed, these 
investigators constructed lists of paired nonsense syllables 
in such a fashion that when the stimulus and response 
syllables of each pair were juxtaposed they gave a sense 
product whose meaning grouped around a topic that was general 
to all the pairs occurring in the list. Sharp used lists that 
made religious or profane meanings (e.g. gad ••• dem, cur ..• sim;) 
Flanagan used paired associates centered around sexual meanings 
(e.g. fuk ••. hor, piy ••• nis.) The learning and recall of these 
lists was compared to control lists having neutral meanings. 
Flanagan added a significant methodological refinement by 
providing a common response syllable for each pair of stimulus 
syllables in both the experimental and control lists. Thus, 
"piy ••• nis" in the experimental list was paired with "har ••• nis" 
in the control list, thereby requiring the identical response, 
"nis" to the stimulus "piy" and to the stimulus "har." 
Differential success in learning and recalling this response 
would presumably be a function of the variation in meaning of the 
sense product produced by experimental variation of the stimulus 
syllable. Both investigators found significantly better recall 
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for the neutral lists than for the experimental lists. 
Sharp (1938) conducted a second test of the assumption 
that words having associative connection to existen6 areas of 
repression would themselves be repressed. She constructed two 
lists of words that related, on the one hand, to serious 
emotional problems in the lives of a group of neurotic patients, 
and on the other hand, to sources of gratification in their 
lives. These lists were then presented for learning to this 
same group of patients. After intervals of two days and of 
three weeks better recall was obtained for the list of gratifi-
cations. Using this same list of words with normal subjects 
Sharp was able to demonstrate similar results. She inferred 
that these findings lent support to the assumption that the 
words referred to areas of anxiety and of gratification 
prevalent in contemporary life. 
(2.) Experimental Induction of Repression. 
Attempts at the experimental induction of repression 
have centered primarily on the technique of controlled pro-
duction of failure and success experiences in competitive 
activities with comparison of recall for failure versus success 
events as the principal dependent measure. Rosenzweig and 
Mason (1934,) using interrupted puzzle performance with young 
children, found that those children rated low in "pride" by 
their teachers recalled more uncompleted puzzles and those 
children rated high in "pride" recalled more completed puzzles. 
The latter, it was assumed,were those to whom failure would 
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have more of a punishing effect. Their preference for recall-
ing completed tasks was interpreted as reflecting a repressive 
defense against feelings associated with failure. 
Rosenzweig (1941), in an attempt to check these 
findings, used similar interrupted puzzles with two groups 
of college students under instructions which made the task 
a personal trial situation for one group and a personally 
neutral situation for the second. The former group recalled 
more of the completed tasks while the latter group recalled 
more of the uncompleted tasks. This preference for recall 
of the completed tasks by the group which felt on trial was 
again interppeted as evidence of the operation of a repressive 
defense. 
Lazarus (1955», in a study of the effects of punish-
ment on recall, obtained significant correlations between the 
recall of shocked words and the recall of failures in a 
success failure situation. These results were interpreted 
as indicating a degree of consistency in the operation of 
psychological defense against threat since, in two markedly 
different threat situations, similar effects on cognition 
were obtained. 
The studies of repression reviewed to this point, 
while diverse in methodology, and at times questionable as 
to the extent to which they actually pose sufficient threat 
to the S's to test the concept, reflect increasing evidence 
that a defensive process does operate to produce differential 
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recall of painful and gratifying ideas. Generalization from 
these findings is complicated however by the fact that the 
various experimental conditions presumed to bring the defensive 
process into operation were defined without reference to the 
response characteristics of the subjects. Individual differ-
ences in the defensive reaction of S's to the experimental 
conditions might easily be as important a source of variations 
as the conditions themselves. 
In a study illustrative of the importance of such 
differences, Lazarus and Eriksen (1952) administered a verson 
of the digit-symbol test to two groups of college students under 
experimental conditions designed to induce a strong sense of 
continuing failure in one group and an enhanced sense of con-
tinuing success in the second group. While the failure group 
gave considerable evidence of subjective distress there was 
no significant difference in the performance means of the two 
groups. However, the variance of the failure group was more 
than twice that of the success group. The authors concluded 
that the failure experience had different effects on different 
subjects with performance being impaired in some and improved 
in others. Such differential effects were interpreted as 
suggesting that at least two defense processes, different in 
consequences for cognitive efficiency, were operating to deal 
with the failure experience. Impairment in function for some 
S's could reflect a repressive defense while preservation of 
function for other S's suggests an isolative defense. Lazarus, 
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Eriksen and Fonda (1951) argued that the differences in 
perceptual behavior which led to the concepts of perceptual 
defense and perceptual vigilance could be understood as a 
function of different types of ego defense, with repression 
underlying the former and isolation the latter. 
In the light of these findings it seems clear that 
understanding of cognitive performance under conditions of 
emotional arousal will be advanced by considering not only 
the effects of experimental conditions but also differences 
in the defensive characteristics of the subjects. 
This approach was followed by Cohen (1955) in an 
investigation of the relationship between defense class and 
cognitive performance that is of particular relevance to the 
present sbudy. Cohen studied conflict around the expression 
of oral impulses. He reasoned that if the defense prefer-
ences of subjects could be specified, differential predictions 
could be made regarding the relative performance of each 
defense group with cognitive tasks composed of stimuli 
relevant to the selected area of conflict, and the relative 
contribution of subject characteristics and experimental 
conditions to the total variance could be assessed. 
Defense class membership was assigned by eliciting written 
TAT type stories to pictures weighted with feeding and 
eating situations and then rating these productions as to 
defense class on the basis of previously devised criteria. 
Cohen"s findings supported the hypothesis that S's 
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characterized by a preference for repression would show a 
clear inferiority for the recall of oral stimuli relative 
to S's showing a-preference for a non-repressive defense, 
while both groups would not differ significantly with 
respect to their recall of neutral stimuli. Two conclusions 
relevant to the present study can be drawn from these 
findings: 1.) since both groups displayed equal recall 
for the neutral stimul~, the difference in recall for the 
oral stimuli can be explained on the basis of differential 
defensive operations within the two troups; 2.) the 
verbal stimuli connoting oral activity were effective in 
arousing a conflict dondition. which was resolved by 
recourse to preferred defensive operations. 
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In the light of the theoretical literature reviewed 
above, with emphasis on the studies by Klein and by Cohen, 
the following three assertions seem tenable: 
1.) Defense class membership is a significant determinant of 
differential cognitive performance on drive related 
conflictual tasks. 
2.) Differences in the quality or level of cognitive control 
are positively related to difference in efficiency of 
cognitive performance on drive related conflictual tasks. 
3.) Within defense classes, differences in the quality or 
level of cognitive control are positively related to 
differences in efficiency of cognitive performance 
on drive related conflictual tasks. 
Where the studies of Klein and Cohen demonstrate 
the predictive utility of each of these control 
processes considered separately, the present study 
will attempt to demonstrate their enhanced predictive 
power when considered in combination. Specifically, 
1. 
if the drive related stimuli are initially congruent 
with the preferred defenses, then both defense groups 
should show equal cognitive efficiency since defensive 
activity would not be aroused. On the other hand, if 
drive related stimuli are initially incongruent with 
the preferred defenses, i.e. structured to arouse 
conflict and therefore defensive action, chen within 
defense classes superior cognitive control should 
preserve efficient cognitive response and inferior 
cognitive control should inhibit efficient cognitive 
response. 
1. The concept of stimulus congruency with a preferred 
defense is used in this study to denote drive-related 
~timuli which are structured so as to avoid arousing 
conflict and therefore defensive activity around the 
expression of oral, aggressive or sexual drive states. 
Verbal stimuli are so structured when their degree of 
impulse or drive expression is consistent with the 
limitations in intensity of such expression which the 
particular defense typically imposes upon drive-
related conflict arousing words. 
III. Assumptions - 46 -
The above exposition of some relationships which may 
exist between drive related stimulus material, conflict, 
defenses, cognitive control and cognitive efficiency will 
now be restated in a set of related assumptions intended as 
a logical bridge between the theoretical and methodological 
levels of this study. An attempt has been made, wherever 
possible, to avoid terminology which has become invested 
with a variety of connotations stemming from the inevitably 
heterogeneous manner in which psychoanalytic concepts are 
translated into clinical usage. 
1. A conflictual task situation is here defined as 
one which elicits competing response tendencies having 
varying probabilities of occurrence, The magnitude of 
these probabilities is here considered in exclusively 
ordinal terms. 
2. Where the stimuli in such a situation are 
verbal, the relative magnitude of the re~ponse probabilities 
will be, in part, a function of either repression or 
intellectualization, for those instances in which one or 
the other is the preferred defense of the individual 
subject. 
3. In an unconstrained or free choice encounter 
with a conflictual task situation, where the task stimuli 
are drive-related and incongruent with the preferred 
defense, the response tendency arising from the action 
of the preferred defense will most readily reduce anxiety 
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and restore homeostasis. In this situation cognitive 
functioning for the repressor class will be inhibited 
and cognitive functioning for the intellectualizer 
class will be preserved. 
4. In the same unconstrained or free choice 
encounter, where the task stimuli are drive-related but 
congruent with the preferred defense, there will be no 
necessity for defensive action to reduce anxiety and 
therefore no difference in cognitive functioning is 
expected. 
5. The defensive response in 3 above has an 
initially high probability of occurrence and in the 
absence of apposing or modifying factors will be 
the response actually emitted. 
6. In the same case the initially low probability 
response would consist of dealing with the conflictual 
stimuli in a non-defensive, adaptive manner which would 
maintain cognitive efficiency for both guoups. 
7. It is possible to add structure or constraints 
to such a conflictual task situation so that adaptive 
resolution would require the inhibition of the h1gh 
probability response tendency in favor of the initially 
low probability response tendency. 
8. People differ in the extent to which they can 
accomplish this inhibition. 
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9. It is inferred that this difference is a 
function of the state of their cognitive control. 
10. Cognitive controls are conceptualized as 
coping processes which act to resolve adaptive problems on 
the basis of given task instructions and the reality con-
straints and requirements of situations rather than on the 
basis of anxiety reduction. They are seen as specific 
adaptive mechanisms acting to modulate the discharge of 
high probability response tendencies in those circumstances 
where exclusive reliance upon such tendencies would result 
in lowered adaptive efficiency. 
IV. GENERAL HYPOTHESIS 
These assumptions and the foregoing considerations 
lead to the following general hypothesis: 
A cognitive response may be inhibited or preserved 
depending upon the state of the cognitive control and the 
type of defense with which a particular stimulus interacts. 
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V, SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES 
Based upon the assumptions and relationships postulated 
above between drive state, drive related stimulus material, 
conflict, and the preservation and inhibition of cognitive 
response, the following specific hypotheses are advanced; 
Hypothesil.a 1: The cognitive reaponseto·a-drive related, 
conflict-free stimulus material will not be affected by differ-
ences in cognitive control or defense class. 
Hypothesis 2: The cognitive response to drive related, 
conflictual stimulus material will be inhibited by a low level 
of cognitive control and preserved by a high level of cognitive 
control. 
Hypothesis 3: The cognitive response to drive related, 
conflictual stimulus material will be inhibited by a repressive 
defense and preserved by an intellectualizing defense. 
Hypothesis 4: Within the defense classes of repression 
and intellectualization, the cognitive response to drive related, 
conflictual stimulus material will be inhibited by a low level 
of cognitive control and preserved by a high level of cognitive 
control. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
This study attempts the experimental investigation of 
a relationship presumed to exist between cognitive control, 
psychological defense class, and the learning of conflictual 
f.timulus material. The hypotheses formulated in Chapter II will 
be dealt with methodologically by the identification of two 
defense classes and two levels of cognitive control as independ-
ent variables, and by the measurement of performance on a pro-
active inhibition learning task containing conflictual content 
as the dependent variable. The testing of the specific hypothe-
ses utilized the following variables: 
I. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
A. Defense Class. 
Within the context of a learning task, subjects were 
allowed to make a series of 12 completely free choices from 
among a large group of synonyms, each of which had been pre-
judged as being either a repressive or an intellectualized 
version of a conflictual, directly drive-related word. Defense 
class membership was inferred if a pattern of choices was 
consistently within one defense group. Each of the 12 
s;monyms selected by each subject was learned in association 
w:Lth a particular nonsense syllable. In the process of 
learning this paired associates list, subjects should have 
developed an overlearned response to each of the nonsense 
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syllables. These overlearned responses were assumed to 
have a high probability of occurrence on subsequent exposure 
to the associated nonsense sysllables. 
B. Cognitive Control. 
Subjects were classified as exhibiting either high 
or low cognitive control on the basis of their performance 
on the Stroop Color-Word Interference instrument. 
II. STIMULUS VARIABLE. 
Conflicting Learning Under Conditions of Proactive Inhibition. 
The same list of 12 nonsense syllables used in the 
defense classifying task was presented for learning in paired 
association with the list of directly drive-related, conflictual 
words for which the defensive synonyms were originally drawn. 
This task required inhibition of the previously established, 
overlearned responses to the nonsense syllables and the 
learning in their place of conflictual, defensively incongruent 
material. Such interference with subsequent learning by 
previous learning constitutes proactive inhibition. 
III. DEPENDENT VARIABLE. 
Learning Scores. 
Group differences between mean learning scores on the 
conflictual learning task were the principal measures used in 
testing the hypotheses of the study. 
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I. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. 
A. Defense Class. 
As has been pointed out in Chapter II, most studies 
involving the concept of defense have inferred the action of 
a defensive process from assumed anxiety-arousing character-
istics of the stimulus in order to account for obtained 
differences in cognitive efficiency. Cohen (1955), however, 
demonstrated the feasibility of first dichotomizing subjects 
into defense classes and then using these categories to 
predict differences in cognitive efficiency. The present 
research will also make this dichotomy but will use a 
technique other than Cohen's since several additional 
experimental requirements must be satisfied as well by the 
classifying procedure. 
The theoretical examination and the review of experi-
mental investigations of the concept of defense in Chapter II 
indicate that repression and intellectualization are polar 
concepts with respect to their consequences; one inhibits the 
access of impulse derivatives to awareness while the other 
preserves this access. However, this is far from being an all 
or none relationship. The qualitative nature of the stimulus 
and the defensive operations of the subject are central to 
the question of how much preservation or inhibition will 
occur. This point is clearly implied in Freud's view of 
the nature of repression(l915b). He postulates that the 
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resistance against conscious awareness of impulse derivatives 
is in inverse relationship to their remoteness from what was 
originally repressed. Stimuli having associative connection 
to, but several levels removed in meaning from the repressed 
impulse will suffer less defensive alteration than stimuli 
directly expressing the impulse. Implicit in Freud's view 
is the assumption that some type of habit strength in regard 
to oral, aggressive and sexual drives is, in varying degree, 
universally present and can be elicited by verbal stimuli 
which have meaning connection to these drive states. 
It therefore seems tenable to assume that in any 
unstructured or free choice encounter with verbal derivatives 
of conflictual drive states, a consistent preference for 
reacting with a particular defense should lead to increased 
attention to those stimuli which represent the drive state 
in a manner most congruent with the preferred defense, i.e. 
consistent with the modifications upon the expression of 
drive state which the particular defense typically produces. 
Thus a subject having a preference for a repressive defense 
should attend more to those stimuli which constitute diluted 
or attenuated versions of direct impulse representations; 
a subject favoring intellectualization should attend more 
to those stimuli which are relatively clear, unambiguous 
versions of the underlying impulse. 
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B. Development of the Defense Classifying Instrument. 
The foregoing considerations suggest that the 
methodological problem of devising a defense classifying 
instrument turns upon the ability to develop ambiguous or 
attenuated (i.e. repressive) verbal derivatives of conflictual 
drive states on the one hand, and relatively direct, unambiguous 
(i.e. intellectualized) verbal derivatives of these same drive 
states on the other hand. This problem was approached by 
making use of the highly developed synonymic qualities of the 
English language. It is a fact that any given impulse term, 
such as kill or rape, has associated with it a number of 
synonyms expressing a wide range of nuances in meaning. For 
example, Roget's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases 
(1947) lists well over 100 synonps for the word "kill" 
ranging in degree of direct expression of this impulse 
all the way from a term like '~strangle" to one like "release". 
It was reasoned that within such variety of expression it 
would be possible to find terms which could be defined and 
reliably judged as repressive and intellectualized verbal 
derivatives of oral, aggressive and sexual drive states. 
The problem-of devising rating criteria through which 
such synonyms could be categorized as to their defense character-
istics was approached empirically. Preliminary definitions 
were prepared, drawn from a variety of theoretical descriptions 
in the literature, and from the clinical observations of three 
experienced psychologists. Using practice lists of synonyms, 
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these three judges independently rated each item as to its 
membership in repressive, intellectualized, or non-applicable 
cat.egories. Conferences were held to refine to criteria by 
determining the bases of ~greement and disagreement. It 
became apparent that judgments utilizing criteria oriented 
towards the stylistic and expressive aspects of defense 
processes were unreliable. However, with these factors 
specifically eliminated from consideration, it proved 
possible to devise a cr~terion which could be applied 
with acceptable reliability. 
For the purposes of this study intellectualization 
and repression are defined only by the relative presence 
or absence, in a given synonym, of the underlying oral, 
aggressive or sexual impulse associated with a drive-related 
noun or verb. The usual, but not inevitable, stylistic 
concomitants of these two defense processes -- the pedantic, 
polysyllabic style of intellectualization and the naive, 
affectively colored style of repression --are ignored. 
If the underlying impulse is clearly present in the synonym, 
regardless of style, the synonym is defined as intellectualized; 
if the underlying impulse is markedly attenuated while still 
retaining some meaning connection to the drive related word, 
the synonym is defined as repressive. 
A mixed list of eighteen directly oral, aggressive 
and sexual words was prepared (e.g. suck, kill, rape). Roget•s 
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Thesaurus of English Words yielded 148 synonyms for these 
words, The three psychologist judges, using the above rating 
criterion, then rated each synonym independently as to its 
membership in repressive, intellectualized or defense-
irrelevant categories. 
In consideration of the validity issues which can be 
raised around such newly devised instruments, it was decided 
to invoke as stringent as possible a criterion of inter-rater 
reliability. Unanimity among the three judges was required 
for a synonym to be accepted into either defense category. 
This level of agreement was reached in 81% of all 
the judgments made. Of these agreements, 43% were in the De-
pressive category, 40% were in the intellectualized category 
and 17% were in the defense-irrelevant group, 
These procedures resulted in an available pool of 
100 synonyms; 52 synonyms in the repressive group and 48 
synonyms in the intellectualized group. For the final form 
of the defense preference instrument, and in consideration 
of the relatively arbitrary character of any such technique, 
it was decided to use 2 repressive and 2 intellectualized 
synonyms with each direct impulse term rather than one of 
each class, thereby allowing for some degree of scope and 
variation in the operation of the defense processes. 
Eighteen direct impulse terms were available 
requiring 36 synonyms of each type to provide the four 
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needed for each stimulus unit. Guided by a table of random 
numbers, sixteen repressive and twelve intellectualized 
synonyms were withdrawn from the pool and the remaining 72 
were grouped into 18 stimulus units, each unit containing 
two repressive synonyms, two intellectualized synonyms, and 
the associated drive related term. While the synonyms were 
judged to be congruent with either a repressive or an intel-
lectualized defense, the direct drive terms were assumed to 
be incongruent for both defenses. 
It will be recalled that defense classification of 
S's was to be based upon a consistent pattern of synonym 
choices within a particular defense class. In order to allow 
such choices to be made under conditions which would allow S's 
to respond most readily according to their preferred defensive 
mode, each of the 18 defensively incongruent drive terms was 
replaced by a different nonsense syllable. In order to effect 
this replacement, recourse was had to Hilgard 1 s compilation 
of tables of nonsense syllables having low association value. 
(In Stevens, 1951, p. 544-545). 
Eighteen syllables having association values under 10% 
were selected and used to replace the directly drive related 
terms in the eighteen stimulus units. No syllable was selected 
that began with the same consonant as any of its four associated 
synonyms. Care was taken to eliminate any alliterative or 
rhythmical similarities between syllables and synonyms. All 
these precautions were taken to insure that, as far as possible, 
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the choices in the experiment proper, would be made on the 
basis of the defense characteristics of the synonyms and 
not because of accidental associations and similarities. 
Rather rueful spontaneous comments by a number of the 
subjects subsequently confirmed that there were no associa-
tive factors influencing their performance. 
The instrument thus consisted of eighteen units, 
each containing a nonsense syllable in association with two 
repressive and two intellectualized synonyms arranged in 
random order. An example of one unit as presented to the 
S 1s on individual cards follows: 
feh 
seduce 
attack 
ravish 
violate 
The direct drive related term "rape" is replaced by the 
nonsense syllable "feh" during this phase of the experimental 
procedure. In the above example "seduce" and "ravish" were 
rated as intellectualized synonyms for the term "rape", 
while "violate" and "attack" were rated as repressive 
synonyms. 
A set of 18 such stimulus units (Appendix B), presented 
consecutively under instructions to select any one of the four 
words in each unit and remember it in connection with its 
associated syllable, constituted the initial form of the defense 
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classifying instrument. A paired associates learning procedure, 
described fully in the procedure section below, permitted re-
cording of the synonym choices, and also the obtaining of a 
measure of learning ability on this type of defensively 
congruent verbal material. 
Initial testing with this instrument, using a group of 
16 first year nursing students (at the Beth Israel Hospital, 
Boston, Mass.) as subjects, indicated a preponderance of 
repressive choices. In light of the more obvious repressive 
personality characteristics in a group of late adolescent, 
female student nurses, this was an expected finding if the 
instrument was functioning as 4nticipated. There was, 
however, a sufficient number of intellectualized choices 
to make reasonable the assumption that a psychologically 
more heterogeneous population would yield two defensively 
differentiated groups. This same pilot testing indicated 
that when learning of this material was measured on the 
basis of the number of repetitions of the list of stimulus 
units required to reach a criterion of one perfect repetition,. 
a satisfactory range of learning trials - 8 to 27 - was 
obtainable with a list 12 units long. Fewer than 12 units 
resulted in rapid decrease of the range of trials while 
more than 12 units made for a task which rapidly became 
self-defeating due to fatigue and frustration factors. 
This finding is in close accord with findings by Ebbinghaus, 
,--~-
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by Meumann, and by Hovland, as reported in Stevens (1951, 
p. 620}, concerning the number of trials required for learn-
ing various lengths of list. Accordingly, the table of random 
numbers was used to reduce the length of list from 18 units 
to 12 units. 
The instrument, as thus developed, involves 12 
distinct choices between the two classes of defensive synonyms. 
For each subject the possible choices range from zero repres-
sive and:l2 intellectualized synonyms to 12 repressive and 
zero intellectualized synonyms. Again, in consideration 
of the validity issues surrounding a newly devised instrument, 
a stringent criterion of acceptance was raised; two thirds, 
or eight of a subject's twelve choices, were required to 
fall within one defense class for him to be considered as 
showing a meaningful preference for that defense. The prob-
ability of such a selection on a random basis is less than 
.10. 
The selected criterion score classified 22 subjects 
as repressors, 29 as intellectualizers, and 9 as showing a 
mixed pattern of choices. This mixed group was considered 
to be too small for further analysis. 
The defense preference instrument as thus developed 
is intended to serve three purposes: 
1. A consistent pattern of choice for one class of 
synonym or the other will classify a subject as belonging to a 
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particular defense class. 
2. In the process of learning the list of synonyms 
each subject should develop an overlearned, defensively 
congruent response to each of the nonsense syllables. 
These overlearned responses are assumed to have a high 
probability of occurrence on subsequent exposure to the 
nonsense syllable. 
3. With appropriate control for age, education and 
intelligence, equality of learning performance for the two 
defense classes will be taken as evidence warranting the 
inference of a more genersl equality of verbal learning 
ability between the two groups. 
B. Level of Cognitive Control 
The set of related assumptions developed in 
Chapter II defined cognitive control as the ability to 
inhibit high probability response tendencies in favor of 
other response tendencies having an initially lower 
probability of occurrence. Klein and his co-workers 
(1959) describe subjects displaying high cognitive control 
as: 
relatively comfortable in situations in-
volving contradictory or intrusive cues. 
They were not overly impressed with a dominant 
stimulus organization if instructions rendered 
another part of the field more appropriate.(p.53) 
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The criterion used by Klein (1954) to define cogni-
tive control, and Lazarus (1955) to define a similar control 
principle, was differential performance on the Color-Word 
Interference task, modeled after Stroop's (1935), in which 
subjects were required to name the color in which a word is 
printed and ignore the color name ~hich the word denotes. 
The present study will also use differential performance on 
this instrument to define cognitive control. Before the 
relationship between the concept and this criterion task 
is made explicit a description of the Color-Word task is 
necessary. 
As used in the present study the Color-Word task 
consists of three parts: 
Part A is a "warm-up" page of color names (~, 
green and blue) printed in balck ink and repeated in random 
order 100 times. The subject is instructed to read the color 
names out loud as rapidly and accurately as possible. Total 
reading time in seconds is recorded. 
Part B is a page of 100 small color slabs, i.e., red, 
green and blue bars in a different random order from that of 
Part A. The subject is instructed to name these colors as 
rapidly and accurately as possible. Total time in seconds 
is recorded. 
Part C contains 100 names of the same colors but 
this time printed in contradictory combinations of red, green, 
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and blue ink. For example, the word green might be printed 
in red or blue ink but never in green ink. The subject is 
instructed to name the color of the ink in which the word is 
printed as repidly and accurately as possible. Total reading 
time in seconds is recorded. 
The use of this instrument to define cognitive control 
follows from the theoretical definition developed in Chapter 
II. Part C of the test creates a conflict between contradictory 
response tendendies; the highly overlearned tendency to read 
words and the adaptively relevant but completely unpracticed 
requirement to name color. Moreover, the physical im-
possibility of separating the competing stimuli gives the 
words a tenaciously intrusive quality the overcoming of which 
requires quite active inhibitory efforts. A high probability 
response tendency is thus made strongly intrusive upon an 
adaptively relevant but very low probability response tendency. 
Differential success at inhibiting the former in favor of the 
latter is therefore assumed to reflect differing levels of 
effectiveness of cognitive control. 
Lazarus (52) has reported on the use of this instrument 
as a measure of ego strength in a variety of experimental 
stress situations. The burden of his findings is that subjects 
who do well on the instrument are not easily disrupted in 
patterned performance by experimental stress nor by conflictual 
aspects of their own personality structures, 
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In some· pre-testing conducted by the pr.esent writer 
using a small number of the same subjects used in Cohen's 
study (1955), performance on this instrument tended to predict 
their recall scores for oral conflict material while showing 
no relationship to recall scores for the neutral material, 
suggesting that some degree of relationship exists between 
Color-Word task performance and cognitive efficiency with 
conflictual oral material. 
As reported in Chapter II, this was the instrument 
which permitted Klein (1954) to differentiate two cognitive 
control groups and then predict their cognitive response to 
stimulus material having experimentally induced conflict 
value oriented around competing response tendencies where 
the higher probability tendency was maladaptive. 
In the light of the experimental evidence cited, 
and on the basis of the congruence between the definition 
of cognitive control and the structure of the Color-Word 
task, performance on the instrument will be considered as 
an operational measure of the second independent variable, 
cognitive control. 
Both the color naming and color-word interference 
sections of the instrument yield time scores which may be 
handled in various ways. Klein (1954) used the ratio of 
times on parts C and B to distinguish his flexible and 
constricted control groups. However, Ligon (1932) who 
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tested 600 grade school children with the color-word task, and 
Lazarus (1955), who extended this developmental testing through 
the high school and early college years, report considerable 
individual variation in response rate and variation of this 
rate with age. Accordingly, Lazarus reasoned that a more 
meaningful measure of the ability to regulate competing 
response tendencies would be the difference in times 
between Card Band Card c-:compared to a response rate 
characteristic of the individual, C minus B divided 
by response rate would then be a more stable index of the 
organiz~ng process underlying the regulation of competing 
response tendencies. Lazarus chose time on Card B, the 
color naming card, as the available response rate most 
appropriate to the color-word interference task and his 
C-B. index became the ratio :s-- Inasmuch as the theoretical 
and experimental requirements of the present study are 
satisfied by this same ratio, it will be used here as 
the measure of cognitive control. 
In accordance with the limited state of knowledge 
concerning the cognitive control function and this method 
of measuring it, and following the practice of preceding 
investigators in the area, subjects will only be characterized 
as evidencing either high or low cognitive control. 
Analysis of the CBB scores achieved by the experi-
mental subjects (Appendix C) indicated a range running from 
0.39 through 1.55 with a mean value at 0.88. By using this 
mean value as a cutting point, close to an even division 
of subjects was obtained. With the limits of the high 
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cognitive control group set at 0.87 and below, and with low 
cognitive control defined by a score of 0.88 and above, 27 
subjects were classified in the high cognitive control group 
and 24 subjects were classified in the low cognitive control 
group. 
II. STIMULUS VARIABLE 
The stimulus variable consists of a list of the same 
12 nonsense syllables used in the defense class categorizing 
procedure, but paired now not with synonyms but with the 
referent of the synonyms, i.e. the words directly referring 
to oral, aggressive and sexual drive states for which the 
synonyms were prepared. (Appendix B) 
This list was constructed on the premise that the 
defense categorizing procedure, in addition to separating 
the subjects into two defense classes, would also equip 
each subject with a high probability tendency to respond 
to each of the nonsense syllables with an overlearned, 
defensively congruent synonym. The new list now requires 
the inhibition of this experimentally established response 
and the learning instead of a new pairing of the same 
syllable wtth its directly oral, aggressive or sexual word. 
These words are assumed to be appropriate stimuli for the 
arousal of the preferred defense. Learning under conditions 
of conflict between adaptive demands and defense arousal 
is thus required. 
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In constructing the various verbal stimuli lists 
used in this study, it might be asked if they should have 
been equated for frequency of occurrence in the English 
language. However, this was not done because the 
frequency hypothesis, first raised by Howes and Solomon 
(1950), was deemed irrelevant to the experimental methods 
employed here. This irrelevancy comes about through the 
fact that none of the studies and discussions involved 
in the debate over the frequency hypothesis (Postman, · 
Bruner and McGinnies 1948; McGinnies 1949, 1950; Solomon 
and Howes 1951; Gilchrist, Ludeman, and Lysak 1954), 
were investigations of learning; rather they were all 
concerned with tachistoscopic visual recognition thresholds. 
In the present study learning was the dependent variable 
and it occurred without restrictions on the duration of 
exposure to verbal learning stimuli. In these circumstances 
there is no clear evidence that word frequency should be 
expected to influence the learning scores. 
III. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dependent variable of the study is the rate of 
learning for a paired associates list of nonsense syllables 
and drive-related words, as measured operationally by a 
trials to criterion score with the learning criterion set 
at one perfect repetition of the list. 
The intended intrusive effect of learning the defense 
preference list upon subsequent learning of the experimental 
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list constitutes a form of proactive inhibition. Either 
immediate or delayed learning scores can be used as the 
dependent measure in this type of learning procedure. 
However, the time interval between prior and subsequent 
learning can be of considerable moment in obtaining 
the desired interference effect. McGeoch and Irion (1952) 
find a consensus in the literature that as time interval is 
increased, proactive inhibition effects increase. A 
sampling of studies on this effect (Melton and VonLockum, 
1941; Underwood, 1945; Underwood, 1949) indicates that a 
rest interval of from 10 to 20 minutes between prior and 
subsequent learning, yields a meaningful superiority of 
proactive inhibition over conditions of more immediate 
subsequent learning. Accordingly, a rest period of 15 
minutes was adopted in the present study. 
Evidence also exists to the effect that an important 
condition for increasing proactive inhibition is similarity 
(formal or meaningful) of the stimuli involved in the two 
lists to be learned (McGeoch and Irion, 1952, p.396). 
It is therefore pointed out that the lists of nonsense 
syllables used in the two conditions of the study are 
identical. This would tend to increase the conflict of response 
tendencies underlying the proactive inhibition effect. 
IV. Procedure. 
The initial subject sample was composed of 60 male 
psychiatric aides at the Brockton, Massachusetts Veterans 
Hospital. As detailed earlier in this chapter, 9 subjects 
- 69 -
of this original group were not used because they evidenced 
a mixed defense preference. In order to utilize statistical 
methods requiring equal numbers of S 1 s in each cell, one 
subject from the Intellectualizer-Lew Control group and 
six subjects from the Intellectualizer-High Control group 
were randomly removed, leaving the final subject population 
composed of 44 subjects divided into 4 groups of 11 S 1 s 
each. 
Subjects ranged in age from 22 to 47 years. Their 
education ranged from 8 through 12 grades with a mean of 
10.5. Pre-employment selection procedures in use at the 
hospital included an estimation of verbal intelligence 
based on the information and similarities sub-tests of 
the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale, personality 
screening based upon the Matson Personality Inventory 
and, where necessary, an evaluative interview by a staff 
psychologist. These procedures produced a subject 
population free of at least any gross personality pathology, 
and whose verbal intelligence quotients ranged from 90 to 
127, with a mean of 102.8. 
All S 1 s were seen individually for the experimental 
procedures. Sufficient time was allowed for establishing 
rapport. All S 1 s were told that the procedure was part of 
a hospital sponsored research project looking eventually 
toward a better understanding of patients but needing now the 
responses of a group of normal people in order to establish 
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some baselines for comparison. Assurances were given that the 
procedures had no impact on employment security or fitness 
evaluations. 
Subjects were first screened for color blindness on 
the Ishihara Plates. Three had to be rejected on that basis. 
The Color-Word task was then administered under the following 
instructions adapted from Gardner et. al. (1959, p.55): 
Part A. This page consists of names of colora. 
I'd like you to read the page out loud as fast 
and accurately as you can, For instance read 
this top line. (S reads the practice line). 
Now when I give the signal read as fast and as 
accurately as possible. 
Part B. Now I am going to show you another page 
consisting of colora. I want you to name the colora 
as fast and as accurately as possible. To make sure 
that you have the color names correct, read this 
practice line (S reads practice line). Now when 
I give the signal start reading as fast and as 
accurately as possible. 
Part C. This is a different kind of page. It 
consists of color names printed in different 
colors of ink. For instance (here S is shown a 
word on the sample line), the word red here is 
printed in blue ink; you would call out blue and 
ignore the word red. Always call out the color of 
the ink and ignore the word. (Here questions and 
repetitions were handled). All right, when I give 
the signal read the color of the ink as fast and as 
accurately as possible. 
The defense preference learning task was next administered 
Each unit of this task had been typed on unlined, white, 4 by 8 
inch cards. On the reverse face of each card only the nonsense 
syllable of that unit appeared. An additional sample card using 
neutral words was also prepared. The sample card was shown to 
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the subject and the following instructions read: 
I am going to show you several cards that will 
look like this one. On the left side of the card 
will be a nonsense syllable, three letters that 
can be pronounced but which do not make a word. 
On the right side of the card will be a list of 
four words. Your task is to pick out any one of 
the four words you wish and try to remember it 
in connection with the nonsense syllable. Later, 
when I show you just the syllable like this (here 
the card is turned over to the face bearing just 
the nonsense syllable), you will -say the word you 
picked out to go with it. The four words on each 
of the cards are completely equal so you may select 
whichever one you wish. Since this is a difficult 
tas.k, after each answer you give I will turn the 
card over like this (here the card was turned 
back to the face bearing the complete unit), and 
you can check your answer. That way you can 
~radually correct your errors. Do you understand? 
(Here questions were dealt with and repeat demon-
strations with the sample given where necessary}. 
The group of 12 cards was then shown to the subject, one at a 
time, with the S indicating when he was ready for the next card. 
After the first, and all subsequent administrations of the 
learning list, the cards were quickly hand shuffled to 
eliminate any serial anticipation effects. Next, only the 
nonsense syllables were presented, one card at a time, a 
response was elicited and recorded, and the card turned over 
permitting the S to check the accuracy of his response. This 
procedure was repeated for each of the twelve cards for as many 
repetitions of stimulus list as was required to reach the 
criterion of one perfect repetition. 
Following the defense preference procedure a 15 minute 
rest period was interposed before starting the final learning 
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task. Most of this period was filled by allowing S's to 
express reactions to the procedures to that point, reassuring 
those who seemed to need it about the adequacy of their 
performance on admittedly difficult material, and by checking 
the accuracy of age and education data. 
The conflictual learning task was then administered. 
A sample 4 by 8 file card showing a nonsense syllable on the 
left side, a word on the right side, and only the nonsense 
syllable on the reverse face was shown to the subject. The 
following instructions were read: 
Now I am going to show you a group of cards just 
like this one. On the left side will be a nonsense 
syllable. On the right side will be a single 
English word. Your-job will be to remember the 
word in connection with the nonsense syllable 
so that later, when I show you just the syllable 
like this (here the card was turned over to the 
face bearing only the syllable), you will be 
able to say the word that goes with it. Again 
after each try I will turn the card over so that 
you can check your answer and gradually correct 
your errors. Do you understand? (Again questions 
were dealt with and repeat demonstrations per-
formed). 
The administration procedure was identical with that used for 
the defense preference list. 
Following the test procedures, those subjects who asked 
for it were given a brief and very generalized version of the 
purpose of the study. Many S's volunteered comments to the 
effect that there were no associative cues available to assist 
them with the first learning task, and that they frequently 
found themselves wanting to respond on the second task with 
a word that had been "memorized" on the first task. 
CHAPTER IV. 
RESULTS 
The variables under investigation in this study are 
defined by the operational procedures described in the pre-
ceding chapter. In this chapter the hypotheses will be 
restated in terms of these operations. The second portion 
of the chapter will deal with Hypothesis 1, bearing upon the 
influence of cognitive control and defense class upon cog-
nitive response to non-conflictual material, and upon the 
issue of the equivalence of learning ability of the subjects 
within these groupings. In the following section Hypothesis 
2, involving the dependency of learning efficiency upon the 
interrelationship between conflictual stimulus material and 
level of cognitive control, will be tested. The fourth sec-
tion will examine Hypothesis 3, concerning the dependency of 
learning efficiency upon the interrelationship between con-
flictual stimulus material and defense preference. Hypothe-
sis 4, asserting that the relationships posited under Hypo-
thesis 2 will hold within defense classes, will then be 
tested. The final portion of the ch~pter will be devoted to 
further analyses bearing upon the interpretation of the 
primary findings. 
I. COGNITIVE CONTROL, DEFENSE CLASS AND 
NON-CONFLICTUAL STIMULUS MATERIAL 
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Hypothesis 1: The cognitive response to drive re-
lated, non-conflictual stimulus material will not be affected 
by differences in cognitive control or defense class. 
In terms of the operations previously set forth, theo-
retical Hypothesis I, to be tested by analysis of variance, 
entails the following two null hypotheses: 
Hypothesis o1 : The difference between the population 
mean learning scores of the high and low cognitive control 
groups on the defensively congruent stimulus material will 
be equal to zero. 
Hypothesis o2: The difference between the population 
mean learning scores of the two defense groups on the same 
material will be equal to zero. 
The alternatives to these null hypotheses are as 
follows: 
Hypothesis A1 : The difference between the population 
mean learning scores of the high and low cognitive control 
groups on the defensively congruent stimulus material will 
not be zero and the difference will be in favor of either 
group. 
Hypothesis A2 : The difference between the population 
mean learning scores of the two defense groups on the same 
material will not be zero and the difference will be in 
favor of either group. 
Learning scores for the high and low cognitive control 
groups and for the two defense groups on the congruent stimulus 
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material will be found in Appendix A. The means of the high 
and low cognitive control groups are 17.18 and 18.99 
respectively, with corresponding standard deviations of 
5.39 and 5.13. The mean learning scores on the congruent 
material for the repressive and intellectualizer groups are 
18.27 and 17.90 respectively, with corresponding standard 
deviations of 5.53 and 4.88. The difference between the mean 
learning scores for the two cognitive control groups is 
1.81; the difference between the mean learning scores for 
the two defense groups is 0.37. 
The complete two way analysis of variance testing 
the significance of these differences is shown in Table I. 
The F ratio for cognitive control is formed with the cognitive 
control mean square as numerator and the within groups mean 
square as denominator. The F ratio for defense class is 
formed with the defense class mean square as numerator and 
the within groups mean square as denominator. Homogeneity 
of variance is assumed since Bartlett's test for homogeneity 
of variance for groups of equal N yields a Chi Square value 
of 3.58 {the critical value of Chi Square at the .05 level 
for 3 df equals 7.81), 
Inspection of Table I indicates that the F values 
so formed are not significant. Accordingly, the null hypo-
theses o1 and o2 may be accepted, permitting the inference 
that the learning of non-conflictual stimulus material will 
I Table I 
Complete Two Part Analysis of Variance of Learning Trial Scores For the Two 
Defense Groups, Repressers and Intellectualizers, and the High and Low 
Cognitive Control Groups, on Drive-Related, Defensively Congruent 
Stimulus Material 
source of 
Variation 
Cognitive Control 
Defense Class 
Interaction 
Sum of 
Squares 
0.170 
0.030 
Defense by 
Cognitive Control 0.014 
Within Groups 14.786 
TOTAL 15.000 
Degrees of' 
Freedom 
1 
1 
1 
40 
43 
Mean 
Square 
0.170 
0.030 
0.014 
0.389 
F 
0.46 
0.08 
0.03 
F.95 
4.08 
4.08 
4.08 
Decision on 
Null Hypothesis 
Accept 
Accept 
Accept 
--l 
0\ 
- 77 -
be affected by differences either in the level of cognitive 
control or in defense class. 
This finding of no significant difference in learning 
scores on non-conflictual stimulus material will, with appro-
priate supporting evidence to be adduced under additional 
analyses, be accepted as evidence that the congitive control 
and defense class groups are equivalent in learning ability 
for this type of verbal material. 
II. COGNITIVE CONTROL AND CONFLICTUAL 
STIMULUS MATERIAL 
Hypothesis 2: The cognitive response to drive related, 
conflictual stimulus material will be inhibited by a low level 
of cognitive control and preserved by a high level of cogni-
tive control. 
In terms of the operations previously set forth, 
the following null hypothesis will be tested: 
HyPOthesis o2 : The difference between the popul@tion 
mean learning scores of the high and low cognitive control 
groups on the conflictual stimulus list will be equal to zero. 
The following alternative to the n~ll hypothesis 
corresponds to Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis A2: The difference between the population 
mean learning scores of the high and low cognitive control 
groups on the conflictual stimulus list will not be zero and 
this difference will be in favor of the high cognitive con-
trol group. 
Learning scores for the high and low cognitive con-
trol groups on the conflictual stimulus list will be found in 
l TABLE II 
Complete Two Part Analysis or Variance of Learning Trial Scores for 
the Two Defense Groups, Repressers and Intellectualizers, and the 
High and Low Cognitive Control Groups on Drive Related 
Conflictual Stimulus Material 
Source or 
Variation 
Defense Class 
Cognitive Control 
Interaction 
Defense by 
Sum or 
Squares 
1.110 
2.270 
Cognitive Control 0.123 
Within Groups 10.497 
TOTAL 14.000 
Degrees or 
Freedom 
1 
1 
1 
40 
43 
Mean 
Square 
1.11 
2.27 
0.123 
0.262 
F 
4.24 
8.66 
0.470 
F.95 Decision on 
Null Hypothesis 
4.08 Reject 
4.08 Reject 
4.08 Accept 
--..1 
CXJ 
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Appendix A. The means of the high and low cognitive control 
groups are 10.99 and 15.40 respectively, with corresponding 
st~pdard deviations of 4.75 and 4.69. The difference 
between the mean learning scores for the two control groups 
is 4.41. Bartlett·•s test of homogeneity of variance for 
groups of equal N yields a Chi Square value of 2.49. This 
value is not significant, indicating that the assumption 
of homogeneity of variance for these samples is tenable. 
The ratio of the variance of the cognitive control groups 
to the variance within groups yields a significant F value, 
indicating that the null hypothesis can be rejected. Since 
the difference between the means is in favor of the high 
cognitive control group, the alternative hypothesis may be 
accepted, leading to the inference that the effect of con-
flictual material upon learning is, in part, a function of 
level of cognitive control. 
III. DEFENSE CLASS AND CONFLICTUAL 
STIMULUS MATERIAL. 
I 
tlypothesis 3: The cognitive response to drive related, 
conflictual stimulus material will be inhibited by a repressive 
defense and preserved by an intellectualizing defense. 
On the basis of the operations previously set forth, 
the following null hypothesis will be tested: 
Hypothesis o3: The difference between the population 
mean learning scores of the repressive and intellectualizing 
defense groups on the conflictual stimulus list will be zero. 
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The following alternative to the null hypothesis 
corresponds to Hypothesis 3: 
The difference between the population mean learning 
scores of the repressive and intellectualizing defense groups 
will not be zero and the difference will be in favor of the 
intellectualizing defense group. 
Learning scores for the two defense groups on the 
conflictual stimulus list are shown in Appendix A. The 
means of the repressive and intellectualizing groups are 
15.13 and 11.27 respectively, with corresponding standard 
deviations of 4.87 and 4.61. The difference between the 
mean learning scores for the two defense groups is 3.86. 
As indicated under Hypothesis 2 above, the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance is tenable. 
Table II indicates that the ratio of the variance 
of the defense groups to the variance within groups yields 
a significant F value. The null hypothesis with respect 
to the defense groups may therefore be rejected. Since 
the difference between the means is in favor of ~e intellect-
ualizing group, the alternative hypethosis may be accepted, 
leading to the inference that the effect of conflictual 
stimulus material upon learning is, in part, a function of 
defense class: 
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IV. INTERACTION BETWEEN COGNITIVE CONTROL AND 
DEFENSE CLASS ON CONFLICTUAL STIMULUS MATERIAL 
Hypothesis 4: Within the defense classes of repres-
sion and intellectualization, the cognitive response to drive-
related, conflictual stimulus material will be inhibited by 
a low level of cognitive control and preserved by a high 
level of cognitive control. 
In terms of the operations previously described, the 
following null hypothesis, corresponding to Hypothesis 4, 
will be tested: 
HyPOthesis 04: The difference between the population 
mean learning scores, on the conflictual stimulus list, of 
the high and low cognitive control subjects in the represser 
group will be equal to the corresponding difference in the 
intellectualizer group. 
The alternative to the null hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis A4 : The difference between the population 
mean learning scores, on the conflictual stimulus list, of 
the high and low cognitive control subjects in the represser 
group will not be equal to the corresponding difference in 
the intellectualizer group and the difference will be greater 
for either one. 
The learning scores for the two control groups within 
the represser defense class, and the learning scores for the 
same groups within the intellectualizer defense class are 
shown in Appendix A. The means of the high and low control 
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groups within the represser class are 12.54 and 17.72 
respectively with corresponding standard deviations of 
3.10 and 4.02. The means of the high and low control groups 
within the intellectualizer defense class are 9.45 and 13.09 
respectively, with corresponding standard deviations of 3.26 
and 5.13. The differences between the mean learning scores 
for the two control groups within the represser class is 5.18; 
the difference between the mean learning scores for the two 
control groups within the intellectualizer class is 3.64. 
The two way analysis of variance testing the 
difference of 1.54 between these differences is shown in 
Table II. The F ratio based on the interaction mean square 
divided by the within groups mean square is not significant. 
Accordingly, the null hypothesis may be accepted permitting 
the inference that the effect of differences in level of 
cognitive control upon learning of conflictual material will 
be essentially equivalent within the two defense classes, 
i.e., low cognitive control inhibits such learning and 
high cognitive control preserves it. 
In view of the significant findings with regard to an 
inferior learning score for the low cognitive control group 
and the repressive defense groups, relative to the learning 
scores of the high cognitive control group and the intellec-
tualizer defense group, the following generalization 
seems tenable; where defensively incongruent (i.e., conflictual) 
stimulus material interacts with a low level of cognitive 
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control and a repressive defense, an interference with or 
inhibition or cognitive functioning will probably take place; 
where the same stimulus material interacts with a high level 
of cognitive control and with an intellectualizing defense, 
non-interference with or preservation of cognitive functioning 
is likely to occur. 
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES. 
A. Equivalence of Learning Ability. 
Under Hypothesis I of this chapter, the finding of 
no difference in learning scores between the cognitive control 
and defense groups on the non-conflictual drive related 
material was taken as evidence of equivalence in learning 
ability for the two groups. However, an important question 
must be answered before this inference can be accepted. 
It will be recalled that on the non-conflictual, 
defense preference instrument, the subjects were free to 
choose any one of four synonyms from each of the twelve units 
of the stimulus list. While a degree of overlap in choices from 
subject to subject did occur, consideration of the very large 
number of twelve choice combinations that can be made under 
the specified conditions makes it highly probable that each 
subject actually learned a somewhat different list of 
synonyms. It can therefore be argued that these different 
lists may have been unequal in learning difficulty, thereby 
calling into question the propriety of using them to establish 
equivalence of learning ability among the subject groups. 
An examination of the logical possibilities 
existing between the factors of list learning difficulty 
and group learning ability will make clear the solution 
to this apparent difficulty. The possibilities are as 
follows: 
a. Groups are ~ 
b. Groups are f 
c. Groups are = 
lists are f 
lists are • 
lists are = 
yields differences in learning. 
yields differences in learning. 
yields no difference in learning. 
d G are J lists are J yields difference in • roups r r learning 
except under special possibility described below. 
If, for the moment, we accept the assumption that the 
learned lists were of varying orders of difficulty, the 
actual finding of no difference in learning scores on those 
lists for the two groups could only have been obtained as a 
special case of d. above, in which the subjects who possessed 
superior learning ability consistently chose the more difficult 
lists while those who possessed inferior learning ability 
consistently chose the less difficult lists. Even under such 
special circumstances, the most that can be said is that the 
contending forces of list difficulty and differential learning 
ability might balance out to yield findings of no difference in 
performance on the defense preference learning task. However, 
such an explanation places an insupportable burden upon the 
probabilities of the situation; there is no logical or psycho-
logical basis from which to account for so unlikely a sorting 
process. If the factors of intelligence, education, and age 
T 
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can be shown to exert no differential influence among the 
several groups, the more parsimonious explanation of the 
obtained results would seem to be that given under c. above, 
namely, that the groups are of equal learning ability and the 
lists, though differing in content, are of equal learning 
difficulty. It therefore is necessary to analyze the intelli-
gence, education and age characteristics of the subject 
population. 
1. Intelligence. 
The mean· estimated, verbal intell:l,gence. quot'ients for·. ' 
the represser and intellectualizer groups are 103.27 and 102.51 
respectively, with corresponding standard deviations of 10.15 
and 14.83. A ~test (Edwards, 1950, p.l50) is used to test 
the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the 
means against the alternative hypothesis that there is a 
difference in favor of either group. The 0.76 difference 
between the means, divided by 6.5?, the standard error of 
the difference, yields a~ value of 0.116. This magnitude 
of~. for 42 df, fails of significance by a considerable 
margin. Thus, the null hypothesis may be accepted and 
the inference drawn that the two defense groups do not 
differ in verbal intelligence. 
The mean estimated verbal intelligence quotients for 
the high and low cognitive control groups are 104.09 and 
101.45 respectively, with corresponding standard deviations 
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of 11.44 and 13.67. A! test is used to test the null hypo-
thesis that there is no difference between these means against 
the alternative hypothesis that there is a difference in favor 
of either group. The 2.64 difference between the means, 
divided by 4.69, the standard error of the difference, yields 
a! value of 0.562. This magnitude of !• for 42 df, fails of 
significance, The null hypothesis is accordingly accepted 
and the inference drawn that the two control groups do not 
differ in verbal intelligence. 
2. Education. 
Amount of education, in terms of grade level completed, 
ranged from 8 through 12 grades for both the control and 
defense groups, The Chi Square statistic was used to test the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference in education between 
the two defense groups and between the two control groups. 
Chi Square values of 0.273 and 0.396 for the control groups 
and defense groups respectively were obtained, These values 
fail of significance {at p = .05, Chi Square for 1 df = 3.841). 
Accordingly, the null hypothesis is accepted and the inference 
drawn that neither the cognitive control or defense groups 
differ in years of education completed. 
3. Age. 
The mean ages of the high and low cognitive control 
groups were 30.22 and 31.59 respectively, while the mean ages 
of the represser and intellectualizer defense groups were 29.34 
and 30.67. Mann-Whitney U tests (1947) of the 1.29 and 1.33 
year differences between these respective pairs of means 
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indicate that these discrepancies are insignificant. The 
inference is therefore drawn that these cognitive control 
and defense groups do not differ with respect to age. 
In the light of these analyses and the foregoing 
reasoning, it appears justifiable to infer that the synonym 
lists were equal with respect to learning difficulty, and that 
the finding of no difference in learning scores on this 
material reflects equivalence of learning ability between 
the defense and cognitive control groups. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
I. General Discussion 
The findings of this study are seen as supporting the 
general hypothesis. The effect of drive-related, conflictual 
stffimulus material in interaction with low cognitive control 
and a repressive defense is in the direction of cognitive 
inhibition, while the same stimulus material interacting with 
high cognitive control and an intellectualizing defense tends 
toward non-interference with or preservation of cognitive re-
sponse. These effects of cognitive control hold within the 
two defense classes of repression and intellectualization. 
The cognitive response to drive-related stimulus material that 
is defensively congruent, i.e., non-conflictual, is unaffected 
by differences in cognitive control and defense class. 
It would seem, therefore, that the nature of the 
relationships existing between cognitive control, defense class, 
and the learning of conflictual material were accurately 
predicted on the basis of the theoretical formulation and set 
of related assumptions presented in Chapter II. Inhibition 
occurs when drive-related, conflictual material interacts with 
low cognitive control and a repressive defense; preservation 
or non-interference occurs when drive-related, conflictual 
material interacts with high cognitive control and an 
intellectualizing defense. 
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Qualitative evidence bearing upon the question of the 
degree to which the color-word interference task matches the 
theoretical definition of conflict employe·d in the study 
(competing response tendencies having varying probabilities 
of occurrence), was obtained from the spontaneous comments of 
almost all the subjects. The clear consensus was that the 
task created an active sense of inner turmoil, an almost 
continuous desire to respond with the word itself rather than 
the color in which it was printed. The comment of one subject 
in particular is a fair summary of the reactions 0f the others. 
"That thing kept pulling me both ways at once, it's rough to do 
it the way you asked." Adaptive demands working against 
preferred response patterns and requiring the ability to con-
tinue functioning in spite of the resulting tension, is a more 
refined, but not necessarily more communicative way of 
expressing the same thought. 
The successful use of the synonym choice technique to 
identify defense preferences suggests that the structure of 
language itself may be subtly attuned to widely experienced 
needs to cope with culturally shared conflict areas. Cameron 
(1938) has reported on the intrusive effects of personal 
fantasy material in the language of schizophrenic patients. 
Language structure was altered in a major way "without 
destroying its grammatical coherence." Whitehorn and 
Zipt (1943) have demonstrated fairly extensive and systematic 
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alterations in the language structure or schizophrenics, as 
compared to normal speech, which were attributable to an 
excessive preoccupation or the patients with personally 
significant material. Hassol, Magaret, & Cameron (1952) 
have shown that when personalized rantasy material is used 
as an experimentally controlled intrusive stimulus, the 
language or normal subjects surrers markedly in its 
organization and communicative erriciency. Ir, as these 
studies indicate, language can, on an individual basis, be 
altered to serve dynamic purposes (in this regard consider 
also the motivated alterations represented by slips or the 
tongue and neologisms), the hypothesis is at least plausible 
that certain dynamic purposes, ir widely shared, will also 
eventually alter the general language structure. On the basis 
or the present study it appears that certain synonyms bear 
an ideational or meaning relationship to defense preferences. 
One function or such synonyms may be to help in the control or 
anxiety stemming rrom areas or conflict that are regarded as 
being widespread in western culture. The manipulation or 
synonyms appears to orrer one methodological approach to this 
area or the interaction between shared intra-psychic dynamics 
and language structure. 
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II. Implications of the Present Findings. 
A. Theoretical Implications. In Chapter II the point was made 
that the study of the processes involved in the development of 
adaptation to reality has centered upon the theoretical issue 
of developing concepts capable of bringing the factors of 
drive, conflict, anxiety, and environmental constraints into 
coordinated relationship. Theoreticians like Piaget and Werner 
have focussed upon the progression from diffuse, primitive per-
ception to well articulated, abstract aspects of thought and 
adaptation, while Freud and the psychoanalytic writers have 
been concerned with the progression from primary process, un-
conscious mental functions to reality oriented, secondary 
process thinking. These efforts, on close examination, prove 
to be conceptualizations of this same theoretical issue. The 
differences between these approaches are more apparent than 
real and seem to arise because of methodological distinctions 
required to test some of the individual concepts. Hartmann, 
Rapaport, and the psychoanalytic ego psychologists have 
attempted a synthesis of these efforts. 
This synthesis would seem to stem principally from 
Hartmann's concept of conflict free ego functions which can 
play a major role in limiting the effects of conflict upon 
cognition, from Klein 1 s attempt to specify some of the attri-
butes of these functions through his concept of cognitive 
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controls, and from attempts, like that of Cohen's (1955), 
to specify the cognitive effects of conflict generated ego 
functions such as defense. Where Klein (1954) used the 
cognitive control concept to derive predictions concerning 
the cognitive response to conflictual stimuli, and where 
Cohen used the defense concept to make similar predictions, 
the present study is an attempt to unify and test these 
theoretical issues, as represented by the defense and control 
concepts, in order to derive predictions of increased 
precision and specificity concerning the cognitive response 
to conflict. 
The major findings of this study reflect this 
theoretical convergence. Using a different methodological 
approach, a defense classification of subjects, identical 
to that worked out by Cohen, is accomplished (thereby lending 
corroborative support to his concept of consistent defense 
preference). Differential cognitive responses to conflict 
based on these classifications are derived and demonstrated. 
Then, drawing upon the ego psychology theoretical develop-
ments, the cognitive control concept is used to effect a 
second classification of the same subjects which makes it 
possible to specify differences in cognitive efficiency in 
response to conflict within the defense groups. Individually, 
the two concepts yield the same dichotomous level of prediction; 
in combination they make possible a four-fold categorization 
of cognitive response to conflict. 
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Traditional psychoanalytic theory, and a good deal of 
more recent perception-motivation research reviewed above, have 
emphasized the anxiety reducing function served by defenses, 
and have underscored the variety of distortions of external 
and internal stimuli which are effected in order to prevent 
anxiety arousing impulses from reaching awareness. However, 
Hartmann (1939) has made the point that defenses have adaptive 
as well as anxiety reducing attributes. Gardner et al (1959) 
extending Hartmann's point of view suggest that the concept 
of cognitive control and the concept of defense "may represent 
the same process looked at from two vantage points--adaptation 
and confliet''(p.l28). 
Conflictual stimuli of the type dealt with here have at 
least two elements which must be harmonized for successful 
adaptation--internal conflict and reality demands. Psychological 
defense and cognitive control have been conceptualized as 
structures suited to cope with these elements. The fact that 
each of these variables accounted for a significant portion of 
the total cognitive response to conflict in this experiment, 
lends support to the view that both concepts are aspects of a 
more general adaptation process. While they may have different 
antecedent conditions, it may be most economical, as Gardner 
et al (1959) maintain, "to conceive of defense and cognitive 
control as two aspects of a higher order principle governing 
a large segment of secondary process thinjcing." (p.l28). 
The concept of defense itself may require some modifica-
tion in the light of the present findings. In clinical practice, 
T 
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defensive behavior has usually been viewed on some kind oft 
implicit continuum. Psychological reports are typically 
phrased in terms like "a tendency toward repeession but 
under some degree of control", or, at the other extreme, 
"an overburdened reliance upon a single defense .t\ Cognitive 
control, as developed conceptually in Chapter II, implies 
similar restrictions and qualifications upon defensive 
action. The experimental finding that even a simple 
dichotomy concerning the level of cognitive oontrol will 
predict differences in the adequacy of the cognitive 
response to conflict of subjects using repression and 
intellectualization, suggests that the defense continuum 
can be made more explicit. Specification of the state 
of cognitive oontrol should allow for a more precise esti-
mate of the extent to which the defensive response to anxiety-
arousing stimuli either governs cognition or is controlled 
in the interest of maximizing reality adaptation. 
B. Implications for Further Research. 
The results obtained with the concepts and method-
ology of the present study tend to support findings of 
other studies which report an interrelationship between 
conflict, defenses, need states, and cognitive efficiency. 
Moreover, this study has demonstrated the feasibility of 
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using the concept of cognitiveccootrol to specify different 
levels of this interdependence within the dimension of defense. 
A first step has therefore been taken toward deriving the actual 
functional relationship that should lie beyond the assertion 
that a type of interrelationship does in fact exist. 
However, before much more progress along this line can 
be expected, it would seem that methods are needed whereby 
the concepts of cognitive control and defense can be dimen-
sionalized. This would open the way toward a number of 
experimental efforts keyed to discerning the nature of these 
basic relationships. 
One such area which seems worthy of further study 
concerns the group of subjects showing mixed defense prefer-
ences. It will be recalled that their relative scarcity in 
the samples made itcnecessary to eliminate them from the 
analysis. If the frequently made assumption of clinical 
practice concerning the desirability of having access to a 
range of defenses has any validity, we might predict that 
such a mixed defense group, studied in relation to their 
varying levels of cognitive control, would show cognitive 
efficiency with ~nflictual stimuli superior to that of 
similarly grouped subjects having a single defense preference. 
Another theoretically important area that could be 
expaored, given a technique for dimensionalizing the concepts, 
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concerns the relative potency for cognitive functioning under 
conflict of high cognitive control combined with a repressive 
defense, versus low cognitive control combined with an 
intellectualizing defense. The theory used in the present 
study was adequate to predict performance of high and low 
cognitive control subjects within each or the two defense 
classes. However, there does not seem to be any theoretical 
basis for asserting that intellectualization under low 
cognitive control is either superior or inferior to 
repression under high cognitive control. Successful 
dimensionalization of the control and defense variables 
would, however, allow for an empirical answer to this 
question which might then pro~ide the basis for further 
theoretical refinement. 
A third area for research suggested by the present 
study concerns the question of how cognitive control might 
interact with defenses other than repression and intellect-
ualization. Would varying levels of cognitive control have 
similar or different effects in interaction with a defense like 
projection or denial? Would different types of conflictual 
tasks yield similar or differing results? Once again, 
dimensionalizing the principle variables would allow for 
far greater diversity in testing the exten~ and quality of 
these relationships. 
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The problem or conflict is suggested as still another 
area ror research by the results or the present study. We have 
regarded conflict with bespect to direct oral, aggressive and 
sexual words as universally present in varting degrees. It 
may be that the intensity or the conflict rather than its 
simple presence or absence is a major factor in determining 
whether cognitive control in the service or reality 
adaptation, or defense in the service or anxiety reduction, 
dominates the attempts at conflict resolution. This issue 
might be approached either by selecting or scaling the 
conflictual stimuli ror intensity or, as was done by 
Gerstein (1956), selecting groups or subjects known to be 
either particularly repelled by or attracted to a particular 
conflict area. Two such groups, added to the normal adult 
group or the present study, would establish three points 
on a continuum or inhibition through preservation or 
cognitive function with respect to the conflict area. 
Finally, an area or clinical practice is seen as 
being opened for research by the present study. Psycho-
logical testing in everyday usage makes predictions and 
assessments about a wide variety or behavior, based, in part, 
on an evaluation or the "defense structure" or the individual. 
Decisions having potentially rar reaching errects on the lives 
or people are made on the basis of judgments about such things 
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as ''the adequacy of repressive defenses'', ''excessive 
reliance upon denial'', etc. The findings of this study 
suggest the possibility that the cognitive control instru-
ment might be adapted, and perhaps standardized, to the 
point .where it could help to modify and particularize 
judgments about the effects of various preferred defenses 
upon future behavior. It would certainly add utility to 
psychological evaluation to be able to identify objectively 
those patients who, while showing a preference for the more 
primitive defenses like projection and denial, also have 
some capacity for controlling the extent to which they 
rely on them. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY 
This study investigates the nature of a relationship 
which appears to exist between the learning of conflictual 
material and certain regulative characteristics of personal-
ity, namely cognitive control and psychological defense. 
Conflict is defined in terms of competing response tendencies 
having varying probabilities of occurrence. 
Klein has demonstrated that the effects of physio-
logical drive arousal {thirst) upon cognitive performance 
of tasks having conflicting response possibilities with 
respect to the drive state, could be partially accounted 
for on the basis of the type of cognitive control employed. 
Cognitive control was defined in terms of varying capacities 
to make differentially adaptive responses to specified as-
pects of stimulus fields in the presence of explicitly inter-
fering cues. Cohen, in a theoretically related study, 
demonstrated that the effects of psychological drive arousal 
upon cognitive performance with drive-related, conflictual 
stimuli was a function of the type of psychological defense 
employed. The purpose of the present study is to analyze 
the psychological relationships which underlie these findings, 
to develop operational measures of the two concepts, and then 
to attempt differential predictions of learning under conditions 
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of conflict based upon these analyzed relationships. 
The present study derives from a background of 
experimental efforts concerned with the effects on 
cognition of motivational states in interaction with 
various types of stimulus materials. The literature con-
cerning this interaction emphasizes the presence or 
absence of conflict as a determining influence. Where 
conflict is absent cognition is facilitated, or at least 
not interfered with; where conflict is present inhibition 
occurs. 
The studies by Klein arid by Cohen indicate the 
probable utility of using both ,the cognitive control and 
psyshological defense variables as means of accounting for 
the effects of motivational conditions upon cognitive 
performance in situations requiring conflict resolution. 
A set of assumptions relating cognitive control and 
psychological defense to conflict was developed and from 
these the following specific hypotheses derived: 
Hypothesis 1: The cognitive response to drive related, 
conflict-free stimulus material will not be affected by 
differences in cognitive control or defense class. 
Hypothesis 2: The cognitive response to drive related, 
conflictual stimulus material will be inhibited by a low level 
of cognitive control and preserved by a high level of cogni-
tive control. 
Hypothesis 3: The cognitive response to drive related, 
conflictual stimulus material will be inhibited by a repress-
ive defense and preserved by an intellectualizing defense. 
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Hypothesis 4: Within the defense classes of repression 
and intellectualization, the cognitive response to drive related, 
conflictual stimulus material will be inhibited by a low level 
of cognitive control and preserved by a high level of cognitive 
control. 
The independent variables were psychological defense 
and cognitive control. A consistent pattern of choices for 
synonyms, pre-rated as being either repressive or intellect-
ualized versions of direct, drive-related terms, was 
selected as the operational definition of defense preference. 
Level of performance on the color-word interference task 
used by Klein was taken as the operational definition of 
cognitive control. 
The subject sample consisted of 44 male psychiatric 
aides at the Brockton, Massachusetts V. A. Hospital who were 
free of any gross personality pathology. Age range was 
22 to 47 years. The .resulting defense and cognitive control 
groups were similar with respect to age, education and 
verbal intelligence. 
The stimulus variables consisted of: 
1. Twelve cards, on each of which appeared a nonsense 
syllable and four synonyms, two of which were repressive 
and the other two intellectualized versions of a direct, 
drive-related word like kill, suck or rape. Subjects were to 
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select any one of the four synonyms for learning in association 
with the nonsense syllable. 
2. Twelve cards, on each of which appeared the same 
nonselse syllable as in part 1,, but this time in association 
with one direct, drive related word like kill, suck or rape. 
Inasmuch as the synonyms on list 1. were assumed to have 
been chosen because of their concruence with the defense prefer-
ences of the subjects, learning occurred under non- conflict-
ual conditions. Equality of learning scores among the various 
groups was therefore taken as evidence of a general equality 
of verbal learning ability. 
The dependent variable was the rate of learning on this 
second list as measured operationally by learning trials to 
a criterion of one perfect repetition of the list. 
Each subJect was seen individually. After rapport had 
been established the subject was given the color-word inter-
f'erence task. Next, the defense preference, synonym learning 
task was administered. A fifteen minute rest period was 
interposed, and this was followed by administration of the 
dependent variable learning task. 
The mean learning scores.for the high and low cognitive 
control groups on the non-conflictual lists were 17.18 and 
18.99 respectively, with corresponding standard deviations 
T 
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of 5.39 and 5.13. For the represser and intellectualizer 
defense groups, the mean learning scores on the same lists 
were 18.27 and 17.90 respectively, with corresponding 
standard deviations of 5.53 and 4.88. 
The first hypothesis concerning the cognitive response 
to drive-related, non-conflictual stimulus material was 
translated into a statistical null hypothesis stating that 
the difference between the mean learning scores of the high 
and low cognitive control groups, and of the two defense 
groups, on the defensively congruent stimulus material 
would be equal to zero. The analysis of variance resulted 
in the acceptance of this null hypothesis, permitting the 
inference that the learning of non-confluctual material 
will not be affected by differences in either the level of 
cognitive control or in defense class. 
The mean learning scores of the high and low cognitive 
control groups on the conflictual material were 10.99 and 
15.40 respectively, with corresponding standard deviations 
of 4.75 and 4.69. 
The second hypotheses concerning the cognitive 
response to drive-related, conflictual material in inter-
action with high and low levels of cognitive control was 
translated into a null hypothesis which stated that the 
difference between the mean learning scores of the high 
and low cognitive control groups on the conflictual stimulus 
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list woald be zero. Analysis of variance resulted in 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the .01 level of 
significance. The alternate hypothesis, stating that 
there would be a difference in favor of the high cognitive 
control group, was therefore supported, leading to the 
inference that the effect of conflictual material upon 
learning is, in part, a function of level of cognitive 
control. 
The mean learning scores of the r·epresser and in-
tellectualizer groups on the conflictual stimulus material 
were 15.13 and 11.27 respectively, with corresponding 
standard deviations of 4.87 and 4.61. 
The third hypothesis concerning the effect of defense 
class upon the cognitive response to conflictual material 
was tested by a null hypothesis which stated that the 
difference between the mean learning scores of the two 
defense groups would be zero. Analysis of Variance resulted 
in the rejection of this null hypothesis at less than the 
.05 level of significance. The alternate hypothesis which 
stated that there would be a difference in favor of the 
intellectualizer group was therefore supported, permitting 
the inference that the effect of conflictual material upon 
learning is, in part, a function of defense class. 
The mean learning scores of the high and low cognitive 
control groups within the represser class were 12.54 and 
17.72 respectively, with corresponding standard deviations 
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of 3.10 and 4.02. The corresponding means within the 
intellectualizer defense class were 9.45 and 13.09 respec-
tively, with standard deviations of 3. 26 and 5.13. 
The fourth hypothesis concerning the effect of high 
and low levels of cognitive control upon cognitive response 
to conflictual material within defense classes, was trans-
lated into a null hypothesis which stated that the differ-
ence between the mean learning scores of the high and low 
cognitive control subjects in the represser class would be 
equal to the corresponding difference in the intellectual-
izer group. Analysis of variance resulted in the acceptance 
of this null hypothesis, the inference being that the 
effect of differences in the level of cognitive control will 
be essentially identical within the two defense classes. 
The present study supports the view that the level 
of cognitive control and defense class are significant 
factors in determining the effect on cognitive behavior, eith-
er inhibition or preservation, that a given stimulus may have. 
Implications of this study for the further theoretical and 
experimental study of the interrelationship between conflict, 
defense and cognitive control have been drawn. 
APPENDIX A 
AGE, EDUCATION, AND LEARNING SCORES FOR 
ALL SUBJECTS 
REPRESSION GROUP: AGE, EDUCATION, AND LEARNING SCORES 
FOR THE INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS 
High Cognitive Control 
Subjects Age Education Verba I lnte lllgence Learning Tria Is Learning Tria Is 
Quotients Congruent Material Conflictual Material 
S 0 I 29 12 9S 18 I I 
s 02 2S 9 100 IS 12 
s 03 31 12 94 13 14 
s 04 39 12 97 10 8 
s OS 31 8 117 19 16 
s 06 2S 12 96 20 12 
s 07 30 9 106 19 13 
s 08 42 II 120 24 IS 
s 09 27 12 102 19 13 
s 10 31 12 106 17 14 
S II 28 9 94 . 14 10 
Low Cognitive Control 
s 12 24 9 94 20 IS 
s 13 29 10 II 0 10 22 
s 14 33 12 92 16 20 
S IS 33 12 107 14 24 
s 16 47 8 lOS 16 21 
s 17 2S 9 101 27 16 
s 18 26 8 97 26 18 
s 19 24 12 90 23 16 
s 20 22 10 liS 21 8 
s 21 31 12 127 18 IS ~ 
s 22 2S 10 94 23 20 0 0\ 
I 
INTELLECTUALIZATION GROUP: AGE, EDUCATION, AND LEARNING SCORES 
FOR THE INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS 
High Cognitive Control 
Subjects Age Education Verba I lnte II i gence Learning Trials Learning Trials 
Quotients Congruent Material Conflictual Material 
S OJ 47 12 100 19 9 
s 02 29 8 114 12 10 
s 03 26 10 117 20 7 
s 04 31 8 93 16 II 
s 05 27 12 100 18 6 
s 06 26 8 90 16 II 
s 07 25 12 104 19 8 
s 08 32 II 92 17 9 
s 09 26 12 116 14 15 
s 10 30 10 94 18 8 
S II 22 10 109 21 10 
Low Cognitive Control 
s 12 22 12 99 12 16 
s 13 35 II 108 14 9 
s 14 41 12 116 19 19 
s 15 27 12 130 21 13 
s 16 22 12 91 24 12 
s 17 35 8 90 22 9 
s 18 23 9 98 20 20 
s 19 27 10 104 20 12 
s 20 35 12 110 15 16 
s 21 30 10 10 I 16 5 ,_. 
s 22 33 12 95 21 13 0 --l 
T 
APPENDIX B: STIMULUS LISTS FOR THE CONGRUENT, 
DEFENSE CATEGORIZING LEARNING 
TASK (A), AND FOR THE 
CONFLICTUAL LEARNING TASK (B). 
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Congruent List A Conflictual List B 
RELEASE 
EXPIRE 
LAJ DEPART LAJ •••• • DEATH 
DECEASE 
REIDVE 
AMPUTATE 
YUZ EMASCULATE YUZ ••••• CASTRATE 
DISABLE 
DESTROY 
EXECUTE 
GAH SLAY GAH •••• • KILL 
ELIMINATE 
FEAST 
MUNCH 
TOV SWALLOW TOV ••••• DEVOUR 
GORGE 
MADDEN 
FRANTIC 
VEF INFLAME VEF ••••• RAGE 
BERSERK 
FEED 
MASTICATE 
ZIL INGEST ZIL •••• • BITE 
NIBBLE 
UNCOVERED 
STRIPPED 
JIG EXPOSED JIC ••••• NUDE 
UNDRESSED 
INJURE 
LANCE 
llUB SLICE WUB ••••• STAB 
PRICK 
T 
Appendix B cont. 
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Congruent List A Conflictual List B 
BOSOM 
MAMMARY 
KEX BODICE KEX •••• BREAST 
CHEST 
FAIRY 
EFFEMINATE 
SIJ QUEER SIJ •••• HOMOSEXUAL 
PERVERT 
HARLOT 
TRAI!!P 
QUJ PROSTITUTE QUJ •••• WHORE 
HUSSY 
SEDUCE 
ATTACK 
FEH RAVISH FEH •••• RAPE 
VIOLATE 
APPENDIX C: COLOR - WORD INTERFERENCE SCORES FOR THE 
INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS EXPRESSED AS A RATIO 
OF THE DIFFERENCE IN TIME IN SECONDS 
BETWEEN CARDS "C" and "B" DIVIDED 
BY TIME ON CARD "B". C - B 
B 
·~ COLOR-WORD INTERFERENCE SCORES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS 
EXPRESSED AS A RATIO OF THE DIFFERENCE IN TIPffi IN 
SECONDS BETWEEN CARDS "C" AND "B" DIVIDED BY 
TIME ON CARD "B". 
Intellectualization Group ( I Repression Group 
High Cognitive 
Control 
Subject C - B B 
s 01 0.58 
s 02 0.64 
s 03 0.49 
s 04 0.68 
s 05 0.61 
s 06 0.59 
s 07 0.52 
s 08 0.76 
s 09 0.67 
s 10 0.60 
Sll 0.48 
Low Cognitive 
Control 
Subject C - B 
B 
s 12 1.55 
s 13 1.00 
s 14 1.16 
s 15 1.41 
s 16 1.35 
s 17 1.26 
s 18 1.14 
s 19 0.88 
s 20 1.18 
s 21 0.93 
s 22 1.20 
High Cognitive 
Control 
Subject C - B 
B 
s 01 0.68 
s 02 0.52 
s 03 0.80 
s 04 0.79 
s 05 0.76 
s 06 0.69 
s 07 0.82 
s 08 0.39 
s 09 0.76 
s 10 0.82 
Sll 0.45 
LOw Cognitive 
Control 
Subject C - B 
B 
s 12 0.88 
s 13 1.07 
s 14 0.94 
s 15 1.29 
s 16 0.94 
s 17 1.17 
s 18 1.27 
s 19 0.86 
s 20 1.31 
s 21 0.92 
s 22 1.14 
.... 
.... 
0 
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I . 
This study investigates the nature of a relationship 
postulated between cognitive behavior under conditions of 
conflict arousal and certain coping processes of personal-
ity. A review of theoretical and experimental studies 
concerned with the effects on cognition of motivational 
states in relation with various types of stimulus situa-
tions finds consensus concerning the presence or absence 
of conflict as a determining influence. When conflict is 
absent cognition is not interfered with; when conflict is 
present inhibition occurs. 
Two variables - cognitive control and psychological 
defense - have been used to account for the effects of drive 
arousal upon cognitive behavior under conditions of conflict 
relevant to the drive state. Cognitive control has been de-
fined by varying capacities to make differentially adaptive 
responses to specified aspects of stimulus fields in the 
presence of explicitly interfering cues. Defense - either 
repression or intellectualization - has been defined by 
varying capacities to recall stimulus material presumed to 
arouse conflictual drive states. The present study utilizes 
both experimental variables to account more precisely for 
the effects of motivational conditions upon cognitive be-
havior in situations requiring resolution of conflict. 
Conflict is defined by the presence of competing response 
tendencies having varying probabilities of occurrence. 
This study tests the hypotheses that: 1. the cog-
nitive response to drive related, conflictual stimulus 
material will be inhibited by a low level and preserved 
by a high level of cognitive control; 2. the same class 
of response will be inhibited by a repressive defense and 
preserved by an intellectualizing defense; and 3. within 
these two defense classes the relationship postulated under 
hypothesis 1. above will hold. 
The independent variables employed were psycholog-
ical defense and cognitive control. A consistent pattern 
of choices for synonyms, pre-Judged as being either re-
pressive or intellectualized versions of direct, drive re-
lated terms, was selected as the operational definition of 
defense preference. Level of performance on the Stroop 
color-word interference task was taken as the operational 
definition of cognitive control. 
The stimulus variables consisted of: 1. Twelve 
cards, on each of which appeared a nonsense syllable and 
four synonyms, two of which were repressive and the other 
two intellectualized versions of a direct, drive related 
word such as kill, suck, or rape. Subjects were instructed 
to select any one of the four synonyms for learning in 
association with the nonsense syllable. 
2. Twelve cards, on each of which appeared the same non-
sense syllable as in part 1. above, but this time in asso-
eiation with one direct, drive related word such as kill, 
suck or rape, 
In as much as the synonyms on the list one were 
assumed to have been chosen because of their congruence 
with the defense preferences of the subjects, learning un-
der non-conflictual conditions occurred. On the other 
hand, since list two contained the direct, undisguised 
drive terms learning under conflictual conditions was re-
quired, 
The dependent variable was differential learning 
rates on the second list. 
The subject sample consisted of 44 male psychiatric 
aides, ranging in age from 22 to 47 years. 
Analysis of variance applied to the differences 
between the appropriate group mean learning scores supported 
the three major hypotheses of the study, Therefore, the 
nature of the relationship between the experimental varia-
bles of defense class, cognitive control, and the learning 
of conflictual material suggested by this study may be 
stated as follows: inhibition occurs when drive related, 
conflictual material interrelates with low cognitive con-
trol and a repressive defense, while preservation occurs 
when drive related, conflictual material interrelates with 
high cognitive control and an intellectualizing defense. 
In general terms, a cognitive response may be inhibited or 
preserved depending upon the state of the cognitive control 
and the type of defense with which a particular stimulus 
~nteracts. 
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